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The “Peace Treaty” as a U.S. Doctrinal
Option and Its Application to the DPRK:
A Historical and Analytic Review
Eric Yong Joong Lee†
Wars have made great contributions to the development of the U.S.
Because the U.S. has often been victorious, achieving the purpose of their
war, most wars ended with a surrender of the enemy or declaration of ter-
mination.  The Americans concluded peace treaties only when they wanted
to fundamentally restructure the regional order after the war or to realize
their strategic interest from a broader, longer perspective in some parts of
the world.  This research is to analyze the peace treaties that the U.S. has
signed so far or has mediated upon, searching for the possibility of making
a U.S.-DPRK peace treaty.  In light of the U.S. practice, the U.S.-DPRK Peace
Treaty will not only be an agreement to officially terminate the Korean
War, but shall be a “magna carta” for peace which is the ultimate concern
of people in the Korean peninsula as well as in Northeast Asia.  Time is ripe
for the Trump-administration to accept “peaceful” co-existence instead of
“hostile” co-existence.
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Introduction
Wars have made great contributions to the development of the United
States (“U.S.”).  The Americans have experienced very few “defensive” wars
in their history.  In most cases, the wars were fought out of the U.S. terri-
tory and ended strategically.  In history, wars start primarily as a testament
to the human instinct of aggressiveness.  Ending a war, however, is artificial
work.  Armistice is an invention of human wisdom under international
law.  There are several ways to terminate an armed conflict such as surren-
der, unilateral declaration of the end of war, peace treaty, or armistice.
Because the U.S. has often been victorious by achieving the purposes of
their war, most wars ended with a surrender by the enemy or a declaration
of termination.  However, when wars were likely to have a deep influence
on the strategic interest in a region, the U.S. signed peace treaties.  The
peace treaties thus formed a doctrinal cornerstone of the U.S.  Since the
late eighteenth century, the U.S. has signed approximately twenty peace
treaties, and has been involved in less than ten peace treaties by virtue of
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mediation.1  All these treaties have restructured the regional order, as evi-
denced by the Treaty of Versailles of 1919 and the San Francisco Peace
Treaty of 1952.
The primary objective of this research is to analyze those peace treaties
that the U.S. has so far signed or mediated, and to explore the possibilities
of a peace treaty between the U.S. and the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea (“DPRK”).  Once concluded, the U.S.-DPRK peace treaty will be a
firm and initial base of a peace regime in the Korean peninsula— one of the
most critical, risky, and sensitive regions in the world.  This paper is com-
posed of five parts including a short Introduction and a Conclusion.  Part
two will analyze the peace treaties that the U.S. has so far signed.  This part
is divided into three sub-sections in accordance to the periodical evolution
of history: (1) New Nation Building (1783– 1848); (2) Hegemonic Expan-
sion (1858– 1921); and (3) Restructuring the Postwar World Order
(1947– 1990).  Part three will investigate the peace treaties that the U.S.
mediated in influential regions of the world like the Far East, Middle East,
and Northern Ireland.  Part four will discuss the legal, political, and opera-
tional matters for the expected US-DPRK peace treaty.  This research will
also suggest policy options for the Trump administration for peace in
Northeast Asia.
I. United States-Signed Peace Treaties
A. New Nation Building (1783– 1848)
1. Treaty of Paris (1783)
Synopsis
The Treaty of Paris refers to the three definitive treaties signed on Sep-
tember 3, 1783, in Paris between the representatives of Great Britain on the
one side and the U.S., France, and Spain on the other.2  It was concluded to
end the American Revolution.  Through the U.S.-Britain treaty, the British
Empire recognized the independence of the U.S. with generous boundaries
to the South of the Mississippi River, but retained Canada.3  The area south
of the Ohio River was to be set up as an independent Indian state under
Spanish control.4  “The northern boundary would be almost the same as
today.”5  The treaty was evaluated as being favorable for the U.S.6 Britain
also signed separate agreements with France and Spain, and signed provi-
1. DEP’T ST., TREATIES IN FORCE (2017), https://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/tif/
[HTTPS://PERMA.CC/7879-YW9U].
2. DEP’T ST., Peace of Paris, 1783, https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/ar/
14313.htm [http://perma.cc/ZYT5-9WPT].
3. Id.  For details, see THOMAS PATERSON, J. GARRY CLIFFORD & SHANE J. MADDOCK,
AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS, VOLUME 1: TO 1920, 20 (2009).
4. The Paris Peace Treaty of Sept. 30, 1783, Gr. Brit.-U.S., Sept. 30, 1783.
5. Id.
6. JONATHAN R. DULL, A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 150
(1987).
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sional agreements with the Netherlands on the territories.7  It was ratified
by the U.S. Congress of the Confederation on January 14, 1784.8
Agreements
The Treaty of Paris is composed of ten (10) articles and a Preamble.
Table 1 shows the crucial regulations:9
Table 1: Regulations of the Treaty of Paris
Articles Regulations
Article 1 Britain acknowledges the United States (the thirteen states) to be
free, sovereign, and independent
Article 2 the boundaries of the United States were established
Article 3 fishing rights were granted to American fishermen in the Grand
Banks
Article 4 the lawful contracted debts were recognized to be paid to creditors
on either side
Article 5 The Congress of the Confederation got the right to “earnestly
recommend” to state legislatures and to “provide for the restitution
of all estates, rights, and properties
Article 6 The US got the right to prevent future confiscations of the
property
Article 7 Prisoners of war on both sides are to be released
Article 8 The United States was given the right of perpetual access to the
Mississippi River
Article 9 Repatriation of Territories without compensation
Article 10 Ratification
Outcomes
The Treaty of Paris enlarged the boundaries of the U.S.10  Considering
the population and markets growing in the trans-Appalachian region,11 the
British built an additional fort in Miami following the war.  The matter was
finally settled by the 1794 Jay Treaty.12
7. ROBERT F. RANDLE, THE ORIGINS OF PEACE: A STUDY OF PEACEMAKING AND THE STRUC-
TURE OF PEACE SETTLEMENTS 220– 22 (1973); see also Treaty of Peace between Great Britain
and Spain, Gr. Brit.-Spain, Sept. 3, 1783 (Fr.), reprinted in EUROPEAN TREATIES BEARING
ON THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS DEPENDENCIES 158– 61 (Frances G. Daven-
port & Charles O. Paullin eds., 1937).
8. Dwight L. Smith, Josiah Harmar, Diplomatic Courier, 87:4 PA. MAG. HIST. & BIOG-
RAPHY, 420, 422 (1963).
9. Paris Peace Treaty, supra note 4. R
10. See also Charles R. Ritcheson, The Earl of Shelbourne and Peace with America
1782– 1783 Vision and Reality, 5 INT’L HIST. REV. 339, 339 (1983).
11. Id. at 322.
12. Katja S. Ziegler, Jay Treaty (1794), 6 MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 449-50 (R. Wolfrum ed., 2012); see John Jay’s Treaty, 1794– 95, U.S. DEP’T
ST., OFF. HISTORIAN, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1784-1800/jay-treaty [https://
perma.cc/9QAJ-KR73].
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2. The Convention of 1800
Synopsis
The Convention of 1800 (also known as Treaty of Mortefontaine) was
signed on September 30, 1800 with France, to settle the Quasi-War
(1798– 1800) which had been caused by the XYZ Affair.13  It was ratified
on December 21, 1801.14
Agreements
The Convention of 1800 is composed of twenty-seven (27) articles and
a preamble.  Table 2 shows noticeable regulations of the Convention.15
Table 2: Noticeable Regulations of the Convention of 1800
Articles Regulations
Article 1 Both sides established a firm, inviolable, and universal peace and
friendship
Article II Both sides confirmed the new alliance and trade nullifying the
former agreements
Article III Repatriation of public ships captured during the war
The free passage for all goods and passports
Articles VI, “Most Favored Nation” trade status
X & XI
Articles Individual assets would not be frozen in future conflicts
VIII & IX
Article That privateers would have to cover any unlawful damage inflicted
XXIII in the future
Article The US guaranteed the French, fishing rights off Newfoundland
XXVII and the Gulf of Saint Lawrence
Outcomes
The Convention of 1800 ended the hostilities with France— a major
European power.16  It terminated the only formal alliance the U.S. had
signed.17  It was nearly a century and a half later that the U.S. entered into
another formal alliance with France.18
13. The XYZ Affair and the Quasi-War with France, 1798-1800, U.S. DEP’T ST., OFF.
HISTORIAN, https://web.archive.org/web/20090204234149/http://history.state.gov/
milestones/1784-1800/XYZ [https://perma.cc/C5AH-E7PQ].
14. Id.
15. Convention between the French Republic, and the United States of America, Fr.-
U.S., Dec. 30, 1800.
16. Id. art. I.
17. Id. art. II.
18. See Paris Peace Treaty, supra note 7.
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3. The Treaty of Peace and Amity (1805)
Synopsis
On June 4, 1805, the Treaty of Peace and Amity was signed in Tripoli
by the United States of America and the Bashaw Bey and Subjects of Tripoli
in Barbary.19  The Treaty ended the First Barbary War (1801– 05) with the
Barbary States whose pirates were seizing American merchant ships and
demanding tributes to the Barbary rulers.20  President Thomas Jefferson
had been hesitant to take military action in Tripoli.21
Agreements
The Treaty of Tripoli was composed of twenty (20) articles.22  Table 3
highlights noticeable regulations of the Treaty of Tripoli.
Table 3: Noticeable Regulations of the Treaty of Tripoli
Articles Regulations
Article 2 “The Bashaw of Tripoli shall deliver up to the American Squadron
now off Tripoli, all Americans in his possession. . . and receive
from the United States of American, the sum of 60,000 Dollars,
as a payment for the difference between the Prisoners herein
mentioned.”
Article 3 “All the forces of the United States which have been, or may be in
hostility against the Bashaw of Tripoli, in the Province of Derne,
or elsewhere within the Dominions of the said Bashaw shall be
withdrawn therefrom. . ..”
Article 4 “[A]ny goods belonging to any Nation with which either parties
are at war. . .  shall pass free and unmolested. . .”
Article 6 “Proper passports shall immediately be given to the vessels of
both the contracting parties. . ..”
Articles 8, 9, These articles discuss the rights of the Vessels of either party.
10 & 13
Articles 16, These articles discuss the rights of Citizens.
18, 19 & 20
Outcomes
“The Barbary States, although they did not capture any more U.S.
ships, began to resume raids in the Mediterranean, and despite punitive
19. THE BARBARY TREATIES 1786-1816: TREATY OF PEACE AND AMITY, http://ava-
lon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/bar1805t.asp [https://perma.cc/Y3WS-QQB5]; see gen-
erally U.S. DEP’T ST., OFF. HISTORIAN, BARBARY WARS, 1801-1805 AND 1815– 1816, https:/
/history.state.gov/milestones/1801-1829/barbary-wars [https://perma.cc/NA9H-
RGBQ].
20. Robert F. Turner, State Responsibility and the War on Terror: The Legacy of
Thomas Jefferson and the Barbary Pirates, 4:1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 121, 136 (2003).
21. See Tom Woods, Presidential War Powers: The Constitutional Answer,
LIBERTYCLASSROOM.COM, available at https://www.libertyclassroom.com/warpowers
[https://perma.cc/Y7HR-PFZS].
22. THE BARBARY TREATIES, supra note 19. R
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British bombardments, [the Barbary states] did not end their practices
until the French conquest of Algeria in 1830.”23
4. Treaty of Ghent (1814)
Synopsis
The Treaty of Ghent (also called the Treaty of Peace and Amity) was
signed on December 24, 1814 in Belgium24 as the peace treaty to end the
War of 1812 between the United States and the United Kingdom.25  It was
ratified by the U.S. Senate unanimously on February 16, 1815.26
Agreements
The Treaty of Ghent contains a preamble and eleven articles.27  The
Treaty restored all captured lands near Lakes Superior and Michigan, and
in Maine.28  Both countries promised to “use their best efforts” stop the
slave trade, as well.29
Outcomes
The Treaty of Ghent returned all captured land so the territories of the
two countries were restored back to how they existed prior to the war (a
“status quo ante bellum”).30  The Treaty also set up a boundary commission
to resolve further territorial disputes, and created peace with effected
Indian nations.31
5. Treaty of Campo de Cahuenga (1847)
Synopsis
The Treaty of Campo de Cahuenga (also known as the Capitulation of
Cahuenga) was approved by American Lieutenant-Colonel John C. Fre´mont
and Mexican Governor Andre´s Pico on January 12, 1847 to end the Mexi-
23. U.S. DEP’T ST., OFF. HISTORIAN, BARBARY WARS, 1801-1805 AND 1815– 1816, supra
note 19. R
24. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, A CENTURY OF LAWMAKING FOR A NEW NATION: U.S. CON-
GRESSIONAL DOCUMENTS AND DEBATES, 1774– 1875, http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/
ampage?collId=llsl&fileName=008/llsl008.db&recNum=231[https://perma.cc/B4XE-
KYLF]; ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, TREATY OF GHENT, https://www.britannica.com/
event/Treaty-of-Ghent [https://perma.cc/PAH6-R87Q].
25. THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, PRIMARY DOCUMENTS IN AMERICAN HISTORY: TREATY OF
GHENT, http://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/ourdocs/Ghent.html [https://perma.cc/
4B35-FU2M]; see generally U.S. DEP’T ST., OFF. HISTORIAN, WAR OF 1812-1815, https://
history.state.gov/milestones/1801-1829/war-of-1812 [https://perma.cc/RQZ4-5K46].
26. THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 24. R
27. Id.
28. H. Chuck, The War of 1812 and the Treaty of Ghent, HISTORIC INTERPRETER BLOG
(Jan. 12, 2015), https://historicinterpreter.wordpress.com/2015/01/12/the-war-of-
1812-and-the-treaty-of-ghent/ [https://historicinterpreter.wordpress.com/2015/01/12/
the-war-of-1812-and-the-treaty-of-ghent/ [https://perma.cc/66D9-DT7G].
29. ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, supra note 24. R
30. U.S. DEP’T ST., OFF. HISTORIAN, supra note 25. R
31. Id.
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can-American War in California.32
Agreements
The Treaty of Campo de Cahuenga contains a preamble and seven arti-
cles.33  Table 4 illustrates noticeable regulations of the Treaty.
Table 4: Noticeable Regulations of the Treaty of Campo de Cahuenga
Articles Regulations
Article 3 “[N]o Californian or other Mexican citizen shall be bound to take
the oath of allegiance.”
Article 4 “[A]ny Californian or other citizen of Mexico desiring is permitted
to leave the country. . ..”
Article 5 “[E]qual rights and privilege are vouchsafed to every citizen of
California. . ..”
Article 6 “All officers, citizens, foreigners, or others, shall receive the
protection guaranteed by the second article.”
Outcomes
Under the Treaty of Campo de Cahuenga, the United States naval
forces seized and pacified the area that is present day California.34
6. Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo (1848)
Synopsis
The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo (officially called the Treaty of Peace,
Friendship, Limits and Settlement between the United States and Mex-
ico)35 was signed on February 2, 1848 to end the Mexican– American War
(1846– 48).36
Agreements
Both sides agreed to end the Mexican-American War and, thereby
extended the boundaries of the United States by over 525,000 square
32. Mark J. Denger, The Mexican War and California: The Treaty of Campo de
Cahuenga, ST. MILITARY MUSEUM (last updated June 23, 2017) http://
www.militarymuseum.org/Cahuenga.html [https://perma.cc/6CFF-593W].
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, art. 5, Feb. 2, 1848, 9 Stat. 922; see generally
TREATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO; Feb. 2, 1848, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/
guadhida.asp [https://perma.cc/6CFF-593W].
36. TREATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO; FEB. 2, 1848, supra note 35; see Gov’t Accounta- R
bility Office, Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo Findings and Possible Options Regarding
Longstanding Community Land Grant Claims in New Mexico (2004); John C. Daven-
port, THE U.S.-MEXICO BORDER: THE TREATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO 49 (2004); U.S.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMINISTRATION, TREATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO, https://
www.ourdocuments.gov/print_friendly.php?page=
&doc=26&title=treaty+of+Guadalupe+Hidalgo+%281848%29 [https://perma.cc/J4GF-
D8VF].
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miles.37  Table 5 shows noticeable regulations of the Treaty.
Table 5: Noticeable Regulations of Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo
Articles Regulations
Article 5 Established the new US– Mexico border.
Articles 8 & 9 Discusses the safety and property rights of Mexican citizens
living in the transferred territories.
Article 11 The United States agreed to prevent and punish raids by
Indians into Mexico, prohibit Americans from acquiring
property that was stolen in Mexico by Indians, and return
Mexican captives from the Indians.
Article 12 Required the United States to pay $15 million dollars (which is
equivalent to $410 million today).
Outcomes
Following the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, between 1850 and 1912
the United States annexed some or entire parts of following territories: Cal-
ifornia (1850), Nevada (1864), Utah (1896), Arizona (1912), Texas (1845),
Kansas (1861), Colorado (1876), Wyoming (1890), Oklahoma (1907); and
New Mexico (1912).38
B. Hegemonic Expansion (1858-1921)
1. Treaty of Tianjin (1858)
Synopsis
Following the First Opium War in the 1840s, the Western powers con-
cluded a series of unequal treaties with China.39  Because the Qing Gov-
ernment did not effectively implement these treaties, the British attacked
Guangzhou and Tianjin (Second Opium War) again.40  Under the most-
favored-nation clause of the treaty, all foreign powers were allowed to main-
tain the same concessions of China that Britain had achieved.41  Eventu-
ally, the U.S. signed the Treaty of Tianjin with France and Russia in
1858.42
Outcomes
The Treaty of Tianjin was the first U.S. treaty with China.43  The U.S.
37. Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, HISTORY.COM, http://www.history.com/topics/
treaty-of-guadalupe-hidalgo [https://perma.cc/52KE-WZBP].
38. TREATY OF GUADALUPE-HIDALGO, (1846) http://self.gutenberg.org/articles/eng/
Treaty_of_Guadalupe-Hidalgo?View=embedded [https://perma.cc/NBN6-VWT6].
39. U.S. DEP’T ST., OFF. HISTORIAN, The Opening to China Part II, https://
web.archive.org/web/20090204235025/http://history.state.gov/milestones/1830-
1860/China2 [https://perma.cc/25GG-JX32].
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Kurt Bloch, The Basic Conflict over Foreign Concessions in China, 8 (10) FAR EAST-
ERN SURVEY 111– 16 (1939); see OFF. HISTORIAN, supra note 39. R
43. See OFF. HISTORIAN, supra note 39. R
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forced China to open twenty-three (23) foreign concessions which
included: the residence of foreign diplomats in Peking, the right of foreign-
ers to travel in China, the opening of the Yangtze River to foreign naviga-
tion, permission for Christian missionaries to propagate their faith,
legalization of opium importation and the coolie trade, and the opening of
ten new ports to foreign trade and residence.44
2. The Boxer Protocol (1901)
Synopsis
The Boxer Protocol45 was concluded between the Western Powers and
China to end the Boxer Rebellion on September 7, 1901.46  The U.S. was
one of the signatories.47
Agreements: Article VI of the Boxer Protocol provides:
The Emperor of China agreed to pay “an indemnity of four hundred
and fifty million Haikwan taels.  This sum represents the total amount of
the indemnities for States, Companies, or Societies, private individuals and
Chinese, referred to in Article 6 of the note of the 22nd December,
1900. . . . These 450,000,000 [taels] constitute a gold debt calculated at the
rate of the Haikwan tael to the gold currency of each country [the
equivalent of $330 million].”48
Outcomes
The Boxer Protocol provided firm foundation for the U.S. to expand
into China and to defend its commercial interests.  On December 28, 1908,
the Americans remitted USD 11,961,121.76 of its share of the indemnity to
support the education of Chinese students in the U.S. as well as the estab-
lishment of Tsinghua University.49
3. Treaty of St. Gemain-en-Laye (1919)
Synopsis
The Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye was signed on September 10,
1919, between the Allied and Associated Powers of World War I on the one
44. See Unequal Treaty: Chinese History, BRITANNICA ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://
www.britannica.com/event/Unequal-Treaty [https://perma.cc/CEJ2-7CBN]; William C.
Johnstone, International Relations: The Status of Foreign Concessions and Settlements in
the Treaty Ports of China, 31 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 942, 942– 48 (1937).
45. Settlement of Matters Growing out of the Boxer Uprising: Final Protocol, https://
www.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/bevans/m-ust000001-0302.pdf [hereinafter Final
Protocol] [https://perma.cc/6P2F-TVS4].
46. Diana Preston, The Boxer Rebellion: the dramatic story of China’s war on foreigners
that shook the world in the summer of 1900 311 (2000); see also Jonathan Spence, The
Search for Modern China 231– 35 (1991); see also Final Protocol, supra note 45. R
47. See Boxer Protocol 1901, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SPANISH AMERICAN AND PHILIP-
PINE-AMERICAN WARS: A POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND MILITARY HISTORY 948– 51 (Spencer C.
Tucker ed., 2009, 3d ed.), http://go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?p=GVRL&u=cornell&id
=GALE—CX2455000839&v=2.1&it=r&sid=summon&authCount=1 [https://perma.cc/
G2JG-TFNB].
48. See Final Protocol, supra note 45. R
49. Id.
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side, and the Republic of German-Austria on the other.50  It was not rati-
fied by the U.S.51  Instead, the U.S. independently concluded the Peace
Treaty with Austria in 1921.52
Agreements
Article 177 required German-Austria to accept responsibility for caus-
ing the war along with the “Central Powers” (a group of nations fighting
against the Allied Powers during World War I including Germany, Austria-
Hungary, the Ottoman Empire, Bulgaria).53  Article 88 prevents Austria
from directly or indirectly compromising its independence.54
Outcomes
The Treaty of St. Gemain-en-Laye dissolved the Austro-Hungarian
Empire.55  The new Republic of Austria recognized the independence of
Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and
Slovenes.56
4. Treaty of Versailles (1919)
Synopsis
The Treaty of Versailles was signed on June 28, 1919 to end the war
between Germany and the Allied Powers.57  It was the key to building the
Versailles system— a steppingstone of the twentieth century’s global
structure.58
Agreements
The Treaty of Versailles is one of the largest agreements comprising
440 articles (spread over fifteen parts) with a preamble, maps, and proto-
col.  Following the treaty, Germany was to disarm,59 concede substantial
50. Treaty of Saint-Germain, BRITANNICA ENCYCLOPEDIA (last updated May 24, 2018),
https://www.britannica.com/event/Treaty-of-Saint-Germain [https://perma.cc/FE9Z-
DURL].
51. Id.; see also Allied Powers, BRITANNICA ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://www.britannica.
com/topic/Allied-Powers-international-alliance#ref1228825 (defining the Allied Powers,
who were signatories to the Treaty of Saint-Germain, exclusive of the United States)
[https://perma.cc/D9CX-4WRA].
52. Treaty of Peace between the United States and Austria, U.S.-Austria, Aug. 24,
1921, T.S. 659.
53. Id.
54. Treaty of Peace with Austria art. 88, Sept. 10, 1919 [1920] A.T.S. 3, http://
www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/1920/3.html [https://perma.cc/JWL3-
A6D8].
55. Treaty of St. Germain, in A Dictionary of Contemporary World History (Jan
Palmowski 2008).
56. Id.
57. See Treaty of Versailles, in A DICTIONARY OF BRITISH HISTORY (John Cannon 2009);
see also Treaty of Versailles, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO UNITED STATES HISTORY (Paul S.
Boyer 2004).
58. See Treaty of Versailles, supra note 57; see also Paris Peace Conference, in A DIC- R
TIONARY OF CONTEMPORARY WORLD HISTORY (Jan Palmowski 2008) (outlining how the
Paris Peace Conference, which included the Treaty of Versailles, helped create the world
structure after WWI).
59. See Treaty of Versailles, supra note 57. R
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territory,60 and pay reparations to the “Entente powers” (The Allies of
World War I against the Central Powers).61  Article 231 required that “Ger-
many accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all
the loss and damage” during the war.62
Outcomes
The U.S. Congress did not ratify the Treaty of Versailles because of the
Republicans’ strong opposition to Wilson’s idealism.63  President Wilson
tried to realize his initiative through a nationwide speaking tour in the
summer of 1919, but failed to refute the Irreconcilables64 because on Feb-
ruary 3, 1924 he died of a stroke.65  After Wilson passed away, his succes-
sor, Republican President Warren Harding continued to oppose the
creation of the League of Nations.66  Instead, Harding signed the
Knox– Porter Resolution to end hostilities between the U.S. and the Central
Powers.67  In 1921, the United States finally signed peace treaties with Aus-
tria (August 24), Germany (August 25), and Hungary (August 29).68
5. U.S.-Austrian Peace Treaty (1921)
Synopsis
The U.S. signed the peace treaty with Austria on August 24, 1921 to
officially end the hostilities of World War 1.69  The Senate chose this alter-
native instead of ratifying the multilateral Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye
of 1919.  The treaty was entered into force on November 8, 1921.70
60. Id. arts. 27– 30.
61. Id. art. 231.
62. Treaty of Peace with Germany (Treaty of Versailles) art. 231, June 28, 1919, 1919
U.S.T. 7.
63. THOMAS A. BAILEY, WOODROW WILSON AND THE GREAT BETRAYAL 266– 70 (1945);
see also Paris Peace Conference, supra note 57 (noting that the U.S. did not ratify the R
Treaty of Versailles because of the Congress’s isolationist tendencies).
64. Woodrow Wilson, XXVIII President of U.S., Address at a Luncheon at the Hotel
Portland in Portland, Oregon (Sept. 15, 1919), in S. Doc. No. 120, at 201– 06, (President
Wilson speaks to a luncheon audience about why the U.S. should join the League of
Nations); see generally Addresses of President Wilson; addresses delivered by President Wil-
son on his western tour, September 4 to September 258 1919, on the League of Nations,
Treaty of peace with Germany, industrial conditions, high cost of living, race riots, etc.,
INTERNET ARCHIVE (Oct. 3, 2017), https://archive.org/stream/addressesof-
presi00wilsuoft/addressesofpresi00wilsuoft_djvu.txt [https://perma.cc/2MMP-ZRCF].
65. JOHN MILTON COOPER, JR., WOODROW WILSON: A BIOGRAPHY 596 (2009).
66. RALPH STONE, THE IRRECONCILABLES: THE FIGHT AGAINST THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS
177 (1970).
67. Kurt Wimer & Sarah Wimer, The Harding Administration, the League of Nations,
and the Separate Peace Treaty, 29 REV. POLS. 13, 16 (1967); see also Harding Ends War;
Signs Peace Decree at Senator’s Home, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 1921), http://
query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9E01E2D71739E133A25750C0A9619
C946095D6CF&legacy=true [https://perma.cc/5QRZ-7A8Z].
68. Treaty of Peace Between the United States and Austria, Austria-U.S., Aug. 24,
1921, 42 Stat. 1946 [hereinafter U.S. Peace Treaty with Austria]; Treaty of Peace Between
the United States and Germany, Ger.-U.S., Aug. 25, 1921, 42 Stat. 1939 [hereinafter U.S.
Peace Treaty with Germany]; Treaty of Peace Between the United States and Hungary,
Hung.-U.S., Aug. 29, 1921, 42 Stat. 1951 [hereinafter U.S. Peace Treaty with Hungary].
69. U.S. Peace Treaty with Austria, supra note 68. R
70. Id.
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Agreements
Article 1 obliged the Austrian government to grant the U.S. govern-
ment all rights and privileges enjoyed by other Allied Powers who ratified
Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye of 1919.71  Article 2 specified which arti-
cles of the Treaty of Saint Germain-en-Laye should apply to the U.S.72  Arti-
cle 3 provided for the exchange of ratifications in Vienna.73
Outcomes
The U.S.-Austrian Peace Treaty was supplemented by another treaty
signed on November 26, 1924, which decided the amount of reparation to
be paid by the Austrian and Hungarian governments.74
6. U.S.-German Peace Treaty (1921)
Synopsis
The U.S. signed a peace treaty with Germany on August 25, 1921 to
end the hostilities of World War I.75  The U.S.-German Peace Treaty was an
alternative of the Senate to the Treaty of Versailles.  It became effective on
November 11, 1921.76
Agreements
Article 1 obliged Germany to grant the U.S. all rights and privileges
enjoyed by other allied powers who had ratified the Versailles Treaty.77
Article 2 specified which articles of the Versailles Treaty should apply to
the US.78  Article 3 provided for the exchange of ratifications in Berlin.79
Outcomes
The U.S.-German Peace Treaty was supplemented by another treaty on
August 10, 1922 for decreasing the amount of reparations to Germany.80
These treaties opened a new era for cooperation between the U.S. and
Germany.
7. U.S.-Hungarian Peace Treaty (1921)
Synopsis
The U.S. signed a peace treaty with Hungary on August 29, 1921, to
end the hostilities of World War I.81  The treaty became effective on
71. Id. art. 1.
72. Id. art. 2.
73. Id. art. 3.
74. Agreement for the Determination of the Amounts to be paid by Austria and by
Hungary in satisfaction of their Obligations under the Treaties concluded by the United
States with Austria on August 24, 1921, and with Hungary on August 29, 1921 art. 1,
Austria-Hung.-U.S., Nov. 26, 1924, 48 L.N.T.S. 69 (1926) [hereinafter U.S. Peace Treaty
with Hungary].
75. U.S. Peace Treaty with Germany, supra note 68. R
76. Treaty Restoring Friendly Relations, Ger.-U.S., Aug. 25, 1921, T.S. No. 658.
77. U.S. Peace Treaty with Germany, supra note 68, art. 1. R
78. Id. art. 2.
79. Id. art. 3.
80. Claims Agreement with Germany, Ger.-U.S., art. 1, Aug. 10, 1922, 42 Stat. 2200.
81. U.S. Peace Treaty with Hungary, supra note 74. R
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December 17, 1921.82
Agreements
Article 1 required Hungary to grant the U.S. all rights and privileges
enjoyed by other Allied Powers who ratified the Treaty of Trianon.83  Arti-
cle 2 specified which articles of the Treaty of Trianon should apply to the
U.S.  Article 3 provided for the exchange of ratifications in Budapest.84
Outcomes
The U.S. ended its state of war against the former Austro-Hungarian
Empire and recognized Hungary.  This treaty was supplemented by another
treaty signed on November 26, 1924.85
C. Restructuring the Postwar World Order (1947-90)
1. Paris Peace Treaties (1947)
Synopsis
The Paris Peace Treaties were signed on February 10, 1947.86  It was
the result of the Paris Peace Conference between July 29 and October 15,
1946, whose primary purpose was to build the postwar world order with
the minor Axis powers.87  The Allied powers (U.S., Soviet Union, UK, and
France) negotiated the details of postwar peace system with Italy (although
it was considered a major Axis Power), Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and
Finland, following the end of World War II.88  The U.S. did not conclude a
peace treaty with Germany until 1990 when the Treaty on the Final Settle-
ment with Respect to Germany was signed.  Up until then, the Potsdam
Agreement had been applied to the so-called “German Question” as an
interim stage.
Agreements
The Paris Peace Treaties contains ninety (90) articles and seventeen
(17) annexes, and includes war reparations, border changes, and political
clauses.89  The Treaty resulted in the fundamental change to the prewar
status of Italy.  First, pursuant to the treaty, Italy was to renounce all rights
and titles to its colonies in Africa such as Libya, Eritrea, and Italian Somali-
land.90  Second, Italy abandoned all its benefits and privileges in China
82. A Treaty between the United States and Hungary, signed August 29, 1921, To
Establish Securely Friendly Relations between the Two Nations The United States of
America and Hungary, available at https://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/US_Peace_Treaty
_with_Hungary [https://perma.cc/258M-NXMR].
83. Id. art. 1.
84. Id. arts. 2– 3.
85. Agreement, Nov. 26, 1924, Aus.-Hung.-U.S., 44 Stat. 2213, 48 LN.T.S. 70.
86. JAN PALMOWSKI, A DICTIONARY OF CONTEMPORARY WORLD HISTORY: FROM 1900 TO
THE PRESENT DAY 533 (3d ed. 2008).
87. James F. Byres, U.S. Sec. of State, Report on Paris Peace Conference (Oct. 18,
1946) (transcript available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/decade21.asp)
[https://perma.cc/4FNC-X5W9].
88. See PALMOWSKI, supra note 86. R
89. See, e.g., Treaty of Peace with Italy art. I, II, & VI, Feb. 10, 1947, 61 Stat. 1369,
49 U.N.T.S.
90. Id. art. 23.
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resulting from the final protocol signed in Beijing on September 7, 1901,91
and agreed to cancel the Italian Concession at Tientsin.92  Italy also recog-
nized and undertook to respect the sovereignty of Albania93 and Ethio-
pia.94  This Treaty also made some changes to the frontiers between Italy,95
France, and Yugoslavia.96
Outcomes
The Paris Peace Treaties allowed Italy, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria,
and Finland to resume their responsibilities as sovereign States in interna-
tional affairs and to establish postwar relationships with neighboring coun-
tries and the Allied Powers qualify for the UN membership.
2. Treaty of San Francisco (1951)
Synopsis
The Treaty of San Francisco was officially signed by forty-eight
nations on September 8, 1951, to de jure settle the hostilities between Japan
and the Allied Powers during World War II.97  The treaty-making process
was fully initiated, led, and governed by the U.S.  It came into force on
April 28, 1952.98  The San Francisco Treaty, along with the Security Treaty
signed on the same day, is said to mark the beginning of the “San Fran-
cisco System.”99
Agreements
The San Francisco Treaty is composed of twenty-seven (27) arti-
cles.100  Table 6 shows noticeable regulations of the San Francisco Peace
Treaty.
91. Id. art. 24.
92. Id. art. 25.
93. Id. arts. 27– 32.
94. Id. arts. 33– 38.
95. Id. art. 2.
96. Id. art. 3.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 3.
99. Id. at 1– 4.
100. Treaty of Peace with Japan, Sept. 8, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 3169, 136 U.N.T.S. 45.
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Table 6: Noticeable Regulations of the San Francisco Peace Treaty101
Articles Regulations
Article 1 Declares the official termination of the state of war between Japan
(a) and Allied Powers and confirms Japan’s status as a sovereign
State (b).
Article 2 Recognizes the independence of Korea.  Japan agrees to renounce
right, title and claim to the territories where it had occupied before
the end of World War II including Korea, Taiwan, Kurile Islands,
and to that portion of Sakhalin.
Article 5 Obliges Japan to settle its international disputes in such a manner
that international peace and security, and justice, are not
endangered
Article 11 Urges Japan to accept the judgments of the International Military
Tribunal for the Far East and of other Allied War Crimes Courts
imposed on Japan both within and outside Japan.
Article 14 Recognizes that Japan should pay reparations to the Allied Powers
for the damage and suffering caused by it during the war.
Outcomes
The San Francisco Treaty terminated the wartime system.  It resulted
in the so-called San Francisco System which was grounds for the U.S.-led
postwar Asia-Pacific order.102
3. Paris Peace Accords (1973)
Synopsis
The Paris Peace Accords (Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring
Peace in Vietnam) was concluded on January 27, 1973 to end the Vietnam
War.  The Agreement was signed between the representatives of the Demo-
cratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam), the Republic of Vietnam
(South Vietnam), and the U.S., as well as the Provisional Revolutionary
Government (“PRG”) that represented indigenous South Vietnamese
revolutionaries.103
Agreements
The Paris Peace Accords includes twenty-three (23) articles.104  The
U.S. and North Vietnam agreed to suspend hostilities and withdraw troops
(Articles 2-7), and return the captured military personnel (Article 8).105
They also recognized the South Vietnamese People’s Right to Self-Determi-
nation (Articles 9-14), Reunification of Vietnam (Article 15), and the Joint
101. Id.
102. Dower, supra note 100, at 1– 4.
103. See Tom Valentine, What was Paris Peace Accords?, THE VIET. WAR (May 22,
2013), https://thevietnamwar.info/what-was-paris-peace-accords [https://perma.cc/
6VE9-2VW9]; see also PALMOWSKI, supra note 86, at 532. R
104. See Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in South Vietnam arts.
1– 23, Jan. 27, 1973, DEP’T ST. BULL., Feb. 12, 1973, at 169– 174 [hereinafter Paris Peace
Accords].
105. Id. at 169– 70.
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Military Commission (Articles 16– 19).106
Outcomes
The Paris Peace Accords temporarily stopped armed hostilities in Viet-
nam and pulled the U.S. out of Vietnam.107  However, it was not ratified by
the U.S. Senate.108  As Saigon was finally seized by the North Vietnamese
army on April 30, 1975, Vietnam was reunified in the end.109
4. Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany (1990)
Synopsis
The Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany (German
Unification Treaty) was signed in Moscow on September 12, 1990.110  It
was a legal steppingstone for the German reunification on October 3, 1990.
Agreements
The Treaty contains ten (10) articles.111  Under the terms of the
treaty, the Four Powers including the U.S. renounced all rights they for-
merly held in Germany, including rights to the city of Berlin.112
Outcomes
The treaty was the final recognition of German reunification from the
four powers.  All Soviet forces left Germany by 1994.113  Germany had not
only reduced its armed forces to no more than 370,000 personnel, but also
reaffirmed its renunciation of weapons of mass destruction.  It acceded the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.114  In addition, Germany agreed to sign
the German-Polish Border Treaty115 to reaffirm the present common bor-
der under international law.
106. Id. at 170– 73.
107. Id. at 169– 70.
108. Andrew Glass, Both Sides Refuse to Set Date for Vietnam Talks, Dec. 8, 1971, POLIT-
ICO (Dec. 9, 2013, 12:02 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2013/12/this-day-in-
politics-dec-9-1971-100838 [https://perma.cc/L4S2-J4SL].
109. WILLIAM E. LE GRO, VIETNAM FROM CEASE-FIRE TO CAPITULATION 177 (1985).
110. Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, Ger.-Fr.-U.S.S.R.- U.K.-
U.S., Sept. 12, 1990, 29 I.L.M. 1186 (1990) [hereinafter German Unification Treaty]; see
generally Frans von der Dunk & Peter Kooijmans, The Unification of Germany and Inter-
national Law, 12 MICH. J. INT’L L. 510 (1991).
111. See German Unification Treaty, supra note 110, at 1188– 92. R
112. Id. at 1191.
113. See id. at 1190; Rick Atkinson, Russian Troops Leave Germany, WASH. POST (Sept.
1, 1994), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1994/09/01/russian-
troops-leave-germany/65e3176c-fbe6-47c4-979d-f5fdcb259f6c/
?utm_term=.C34a52ff8922 [https://perma.cc/PEW9-9VPW].
114. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Mar. 5, 1970, 21 U.S.T.
483.
115. Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of Poland on
the confirmation of the frontier between them, Ger.-Pol., Nov. 14, 1990, http://
www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/DEU-
POL1990CF.PDF [https://perma.cc/MM4G-KNQR].
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\51-1\CIN103.txt unknown Seq: 18 27-AUG-18 14:49
118 Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 51
II. United States-Mediated Peace Treaties
A. Far East: Treaty of Portsmouth (1905)
Synopsis
The Treaty of Portsmouth formally ended the Russo-Japanese War
(1904– 05).116  It was signed on September 5, 1905 under the mediation of
U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt.117  The treaty was ratified in 1905 by
both Japan (October 10)118 and Russia (October 14).119
American Involvement
The war was not fully supported by the Russian government due to the
increasing threat of revolution at home.120  Also, the Japanese economy
was severely strained by the war, with rapidly growing foreign debts and
long supply lines.121  Both sides finally recognized that prolonging the war
would not benefit any of them.122  In July 1904, Japan began to attempt
mediation via President Theodore Roosevelt, who had publicly expressed a
pro-Japanese stance.123  The Katsura Taro cabinet asked Roosevelt to inter-
mediate the two sides.124  Roosevelt accepted the Japanese proposal
because he had concerns regarding the strengthening military power of
Japan and its impact on long-term American interests in Asia.125  In Febru-
ary 1905, Roosevelt started his mission for ceasefire.126  It was not until
June 8, 1905 that a positive reply was delivered from Russia.127  Roosevelt
met the two sides at Portsmouth, New Hampshire and finally brought both
sides to end hostilities.128
Agreements
The Treaty of Portsmouth contains fifteen (15) articles.129  Table 7
shows notable regulations of the Treaty.
116. ROTEM KOWNER, HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 15, 17– 18
(2006).
117. See The Treaty of Portsmouth and the Russo-Japanese War, 1904– 1905, U.S. DEP’T
ST., OFF. HISTORIAN, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1899-1913/portsmouth-treaty
[hereinafter Russo-Japanese War] [https://perma.cc/K99E-HG3C].
118. See Minutes on Ratification of the Russo-Japanese Peace Treaty, PRIVY COUNCIL,
https://www.jacar.go.jp/english/nichiro/sumitsuin.htm [https://perma.cc/2CGT-
4FUJ].
119. See ANTON I. DENIKIN, THE CAREER OF A TSARIST OFFICER: MEMOIRS, 1872– 1916
153 (Margaret Patoski trans., Univ. Minn. Press 1975).
120. See KOWNER, supra note 116, at 16. R
121. See id. at 17.
122. See id. at 17– 18.
123. See id. at 301– 02.
124. See id.
125. See id.; Russo-Japanese War, supra note 117. R
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.; see also F. De Martens, The Portsmouth Peace Conference, 181 N. AM. REV.
558, 641 (1905).
129. For the full text, see Treaty of Portsmouth Ending the Russo-Japanese War, WORLD
WAR 1 ARCHIVE, https://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Treaty_of_Portsmouth_ending
_the_Russo-Japanese_War [https://perma.cc/B2N5-4WXA].
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Table 7: Notable Articles of the Treaty of Portsmouth
Articles Regulations
Article 2 Russia acknowledges Japan’s political, military and economic
interest in Korea.
Article 3 Both sides mutually engage to evacuate completely and
simultaneously Manchuria and to restore entirely and completely
all portions of Manchuria in occupation, or under the control of
the Japanese or Russian troops.
Articles 5-9 Russia assigns to Japan territories, railways, traffic and properties
in Manchuria.
Article 11 Russia engages to arrange with Japan for granting to Japanese
subjects rights of fishery along the coasts of the Russian
possession in the Japan, Okhotsk and Bering Seas.
Outcomes
The Treaty of Portsmouth resolved hostilities in the Far East, creating
peace between Russia and Japan for the next three decades.130  As a result
of the treaty, Japan emerged as a rising power, while Russia abandoned its
expansionist policies towards the east.131  Additionally, the United States
annexed the Philippines and became involved in that region.132
B. Middle East Peace Treaties
1. Camp David Accords (1978)
Synopsis
Following twelve days of secret negotiation, Egyptian President Anwar
El Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin signed the Camp
David Accords on September 17, 1978.133  The two framework agreements
were signed at the White House under the United States President Jimmy
Carter’s mediation.134
American Involvement: Carter Initiative
Upon taking office in early 1977, President Carter initiated the Middle
East peace process.  Throughout his presidency, Carter tried to maintain a
130. Treaty of Portsmouth, REVOLVY, https://www.revolvy.com/topic/Treaty%20of%20
Portsmouth [https://perma.cc/WR7C-SEZC].
131. Russo-Japanese War, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (last updated May 24, 2018),
https://www.britannica.com/event/Russo-Japanese-War [https://perma.cc/ZAF2-
DRTN].
132. KOWNER, supra note 116. See GEOFFREY JUKES, THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR R
1904– 1905, 86– 90 (Oxford: Osprey 2002); see also U.S. DEP’T ST., OFF. HISTORIAN, Japa-
nese-American Relations at the Turn of the Century, 1900– 1912, U.S. Dep’t Hist., https://
history.state.gov/milestones/1899-1913/japanese-relations [https://perma.cc/FH37-
3Q2H].
133. Camp David Accords and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process, U.S. DEP’T ST., OFF.
HISTORIAN, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1977-1980/camp-david [https://perma.
cc/FTL5-P88C].
134. Carter Reflects on Camp David Accords, NPR (Sept. 17, 2003, 12:00 AM), https://
www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=1433186 [https://perma.cc/6EJ2-
6JB3].
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comprehensive and multilateral approach.135  Carter’s main terms for Mid-
dle East peace were threefold: (1) Arab recognition of Israel’s right to exist
in peace; (2) Israel’s withdrawal from occupied territories gained by the
Six-Day War; and (3) securing an undivided Jerusalem.136
The Camp David Accords were the result of the joint works between
Egypt, Israel and the United States.  Initially, President Cater concentrated
his efforts on a comprehensive resolution of disputes between Israel and
the Arab countries with a bilateral agreement.  Carter presented the follow-
ing five preliminary goals for Begin to achieve: (1) a comprehensive peace
affecting all of Israel’s neighbors; (2) peace to be based on the UN Security
Council Resolution 242; (3) open borders and free trade; (4) Israel’s with-
drawal from occupied territories to secure borders; (5) creation of a Pales-
tinian entity (but not an independent nation).137  Ultimately, Begin
accepted each goal except for the fifth.138
Two Framework Agreements
The Camp David Accords are composed of two separate agreements:
“A Framework for Peace in the Middle East” and “A Framework for the
Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel.”139
The first, “A Framework for Peace in the Middle East.” dealt with Pales-
tinian territories.140  The framework consists of three parts.  The first part
of the framework was to establish an autonomous self-governing authority
in the West Bank and the Gaza strip and to fully implement Resolution
242.141  The Accords recognized the “legitimate rights of the Palestinian
people” and the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the West Bank and
Gaza,142 but did not refer to Golan Heights, Syria, or Lebanon.  It was not
the comprehensive peace that the U.S. had in mind.143  The second part of
the framework dealt with Egyptian-Israeli relations.144  The third part
declared the “Associated Principles,” which were to apply to relations
135. See The Brookings Report on the Middle East, 6 J. PALESTINE STUD. 195, 197 (1977).
For details on Carter Initiative, see Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977-August 1978:
Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC 3, VIII F.R.U.S. (1977-1980) 1ff (A. Howard ed.,
2013), available at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v08/d1
[https://perma.cc/M2Z2-6C3Q].
136. Camp David Accords: Jimmy Carter Reflects 25 Years Later, The Carter Center,
Sept. 16, 2003, available at https://www.cartercenter.org/news/documents/doc1482.
html [https://perma.cc/F9PU-PAPX].
137. GEORGE LENCZOWSKI, AMERICAN PRESIDENTS AND THE MIDDLE EAST 165 (Durham,
N.C., Duke Univ. Press 1990).
138. Id.
139. Camp David Accords; Sept. 17, 1978, AVALON PROJECT, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/
20th_century/campdav.asp [https://perma.cc/YH48-H54V].
140. Jimmy Carter Presidential Library and Museum, The Framework for Peace in the
Middle East, JIMMY CARTER LIBRARY,  https://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/research/
framework_for_peace_in_the_middle_east [hereinafter Framework for Peace in the Mid-
dle East] [https://perma.cc/42PA-PLDF].
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. KENNETH STEIN, HEROIC DIPLOMACY: SADAT, KISSINGER, CARTER, BEGIN, AND THE
QUEST FOR ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE 254 (Taylor & Francis, 1999).
144. Framework for Peace in the Middle East, supra note 140. R
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between Israel and all of its Arab neighbors.145
The second framework (A Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace
Treaty between Egypt and Israel) provided a ground for the peace treaty on
the future status of the Sinai Peninsula.146  Here, Israel agreed to withdraw
its armed forces from Sinai and evacuate the 4500 civilian inhabitants.
Under this framework, the U.S. committed to several billion dollars of
annual subsidies to support Israel and Egypt.147
Outcomes
The Camp David Accords dissolved a united Arab front against Israel.
The Accords shed light on the Palestinian question as a primary issue in
the Arab-Israeli conflict.148  In particular, the second framework drove
Egypt and Israel to sign the 1979 Peace Treaty.149  The Continuum Political
Encyclopedia of the Middle East provides:
The normalization of relations [between Israel and Egypt] went into effect in
January 1980.  Ambassadors were exchanged in February.  The boycott laws
were repealed by Egypt’s National Assembly the same month, and some
trade began to develop, albeit less than Israel had hoped for.  In March 1980
regular airline flights were inaugurated.  Egypt also began supplying Israel
with crude oil.150
Kenneth Stein also maintains:
The Accords were another interim agreement or step, but negotiations that
flowed from the Accords slowed for several reasons.  These included an
inability to bring the Jordanians into the discussions; the controversy over
settlements; the inconclusive nature of the subsequent autonomy talks;
domestic opposition sustained by both Begin and Sadat and, in Sadat’s case,
ostracism and anger from the Arab world; the emergence of a what became a
cold peace between Egypt and Israel; and changes in foreign policy priorities
including discontinuity in personnel committed to sustaining the negotiat-
ing process.151
The UN General Assembly, however, disapproved of the first framework,
because it was negotiated and signed without participation of the UN and
the Palestine Liberation Organization (“PLO”).152  The General Assembly
adopted Resolution 33/28(A), which declares that agreements were only
valid if they included the Palestinian right to national independence and
sovereignty.153
145. Id.
146. A Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel, Isr.
- Egypt, Sept. 17, 1978, 1138 U.N.T.S. 17854 [hereinafter Conclusion].
147. Yitzhak Benhorin, Israel still top recipient of US foreign aid, YNETNEWS, (Aug. 2,
2007, 7:24 AM), http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3362402,00.html [https:/
/perma.cc/MXP6-977H].
148. See WILLIAM B. QUANDT, Introduction, in THE MIDDLE EAST: TEN YEARS AFTER CAMP
DAVID 8 (Quandt ed. 1998).
149. See Conclusion, supra note 146. R
150. AVRAHAM SELA, THE DECLINE OF ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT 100 (1997).
151. STEIN, supra note 143, at 254. R
152. See G.A. Res. 33/28A, ¶ 4, (Dec. 7, 1978).
153. Id.
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2. Oslo Accords (1993-95)
Synopsis
Israel and the PLO concluded the Declaration of Principles on Interim
Self-Government Arrangements (Oslo Accords).154  The Oslo Accords con-
sist of two parts: Oslo I Accord, signed in Washington, D.C., in 1993155
under the mediation of President Bill Clinton,156 and Oslo II Accord,
signed in Taba in 1995.157  The Oslo Accords were followed by the Oslo
[peace] process to make a peace treaty for the “right of the Palestinian peo-
ple to self-determination.”158
American Involvement
The Clinton administration mediated the secret negotiations between
Israel and the PLO in Oslo.159  However, the U.S. was not deeply involved
in this peace process.160  Instead, Clinton personally encouraged Arafat
and Rabin to shake hands.161
Oslo I Accord
The Oslo I Accord is composed of seventeen (17) articles with four (4)
annexes and two (2) Agreed Minutes.162  Table 8 shows structure of the
Oslo I Accord.
Table 8: The Structure of the Oslo I Accord
Annexes Regulations
Annex 1 Conditions of Palestinian Elections
Annex 2 Withdrawal of Israeli forces
Annex 3 Economic cooperation
Annex 4 Regional development
Agreed Minutes Regulations
Agreed Minutes 1 General understandings
Agreed Minutes 2 Specific understandings
154. Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Gov’t Arrangements, U.N. Doc. A/48/
486-S/26560 (1993) [Hereinafter Declaration].
155. Id.
156. See William Jefferson Clinton, President, United States, Address at the Israeli-
Palestinian Interim Agreement Signing Ceremony delivered (Sept. 28, 1995), http://
americanrhetoric.com/speeches/OsloII/wjclintonosloII.htm [https://perma.cc/Q6FY-
7TPC]; See also BILL CLINTON, MY LIFE 541– 45 (Justin Cooper ed., 2005).
157. Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza, U.N. Doc.
A/51/889-S/1997/357 (1995). [Hereinafter Interm] https://web.archive.org/web/
20021115180646/http://knesset.gov.il/process/docs/heskemb_eng.htm [https://
perma.cc/D99M-H75A].
158. See generally UN, The Right of Self-Determination of the Palestinian People
(1979), http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/Espiell_1978.pdf [https://perma.cc/DC99-UR9T].
159. See Clinton, supra note 156, at 541. R
160. Id.
161. Id. at 543.
162. See Declaration, supra note 154. R
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Oslo II Accord (Taba Agreement)
The Oslo II Accord not only declares peaceful coexistence, mutual dig-
nity and security, but also mutually recognizes the legitimate and political
rights of the parties.163  Its main purpose was to establish a Palestinian
Interim Self-Government Authority in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip,
for a transitional period not exceeding five years.164  The Oslo II Accord
contains thirty-one (31) articles.165  Table 9 shows the main chapters with
its titles.
Table 9: The Main Chapters of the Taba Agreement
Chapters Articles Titles Regulations
Chapter 1 Articles I– IX The Palestinian the role and powers of governing
Council Palestinian council and
committee for civil affairs and
the power transfer from Israel to
the Palestinian Council.
Chapter 2 Articles X– XVI Redeployment the redeployment of the Israel
and Security Defense Forces, roles of the
Arrangements Israeli Security Forces and the
Israeli police, . . . the role of the
Palestinian police, etc.
Chapter 3 Articles Legal Affairs the scope of the Palestinian
XVII– XXI Council’s authority and
jurisdiction and the resolution of
conflicts, and the legislative
powers of the Council.
Chapter 4 Articles Cooperation the relations between Israel and
XXII– XXVIII the Council
Chapter 5 Articles Miscellaneous
XXIX– XXXI provisions.
Outcome
Israel accepted the PLO as the representative of the Palestinians, while
the PLO renounced terrorism and recognized Israel’s right to exist in
peace.166  Both Israel and the PLO agreed to establish Palestinian Authority
(“PA”) that would assume governing responsibilities in the West Bank and
Gaza Strip over a five-year period.167  The PLO became Israel’s partner for
negotiations to resolve issues such as: the Israel-Palestine borders, the
Israeli settlements, the status of Jerusalem, and Israel’s military pres-
ence.168  The Oslo Accords, however, did not create a Palestinian state.169
163. See Interm, supra note 157. R
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. U.S. DEP’T ST., OFF. HISTORIAN, The Oslo Accords and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process,
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1993-2000/oslo [https://perma.cc/K7FR-6X3M].
167. Id.
168. Id.
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C. Northern Ireland Peace Agreement: The Belfast Agreement (1998)
Synopsis
The Belfast Agreement (Good Friday Agreement), mandating demo-
cratic power sharing between Northern Irish parties, was signed on April
10, 1998.170  It built a plan for devolved government in Northern Ireland
and created Human Rights and Equality commissions.171  All parties
agreed to “exclusively [use] peaceful and democratic means.”172
Background: “The Troubles” in Northern Ireland (1968-1998)
The constitutional status of Northern Ireland caused serious troubles
between October 5, 1968 and April 10, 1998.173  Throughout this period,
two political factions clashed with each other.  The unionist Protestant
majority wished to remain part of the UK, while the nationalist, republican
and almost entirely Catholic minority wished to become part of the Repub-
lic of Ireland.174  More fundamentally, however, this was a “territorial” con-
flict.175  Two exclusively opposite views of national identity were at the
heart of this conflict.176  During the Troubles, more than 3600 people were
killed and about 50,000 more were physically maimed or injured.177
Evolution
For over fifty years, up until 1968, the unionists dominated the parlia-
ment of Northern Ireland parliament.178  As the unionists seriously dis-
criminated against Catholic nationalists, serious tensions and violence
flared between the two sides.179  In 1969, the UK carried out a military
intervention into Northern Ireland, but failed to restore social order.180  In
1972, as things were deteriorating, the British finally suspended the parlia-
169. Chris Hedges, Mideast accord: the overview; Rabin and Arafat sign accord ending
Israel’s 27-year hold on Jericho and the Gaza Strip, N.Y. TIMES (May 5, 1994), http://
www.nytimes.com/1994/05/05/world/mideast-accord-overview-rabin-arafat-sign-
accord-ending-israel-s-27-year-hold.html?pagewanted=all [https://perma.cc/9VRC-
RQBP]. For details, see Avi Shlaim, The Oslo Accord, 23 J. PALESTINE STUD. 24, 34 (1994);
Jodi Rudoren, What the Oslo Accords Accomplished, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2015, https://
www.nytimes.com/2015/10/01/world/middleeast/palestinians-mahmoud-abbas-oslo-
peace-accords.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/T4ZS-U4YE]; Rawan Damen, The Price of
Oslo, AL JAZEERA, , http://interactive.aljazeera.com/aje/PalestineRemix/the-price-of-
oslo.html#/14 [https://perma.cc/G6C6-XPGH].
170. Good Friday Agreement, BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/events/good_friday
_agreement [https://perma.cc/32CU-RAUW].
171. Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and the Government of Ireland, U.K.-N. Ir., Apr. 10, 1998, 2114 U.N.T.S.
473, ¶¶ 5– 6.
172. Id. ¶¶ 1, 4.
173. The Troubles, BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/troubles [https://perma.cc/
E42T-V2RS].
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
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ment of Northern Ireland and directly controlled the region.181  Accord-
ingly, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (“PIRA”), which later became
the IRA, declared the “long war” to resist against the British presence in
Northern Ireland.182  In order to come out of the political deadlock with-
out serious violence, the UK and the Irish governments, and three North-
ern Ireland political parties signed the Sunningdale Agreement in 1973.183
The Agreement delegated responsibility for the internal affairs of Northern
Ireland (i.e. the so called “Irish Dimension”) to the Irish government184
However, the Sunningdale system collapsed in early 1974 because of the
Ulster Workers Council strike.185  In 1985, the Anglo-Irish Agreement was
concluded to resolve the so-called “Irish question.”186  It confirmed that
“no Irish unification” could exist without the consent of its people.187  The
“long war” ended when the IRA announced a ceasefire in 1994 and entered
into negotiations to end “the Troubles” and restore self-government to
Northern Ireland.188
American Involvement
Traditionally, the U.S. did not have much interest in Northern Ireland;
it was the Clinton administration that began intervening into Northern Ire-
land from 1995.189  Because the Clinton administration regarded the
Northern Ireland peace process as an internal affair of the UK,190 the
White House’s approach to this peace process was just pragmatic.  When
cross-party talks began in 1996, President Clinton appointed the former
U.S. Senator George Mitchell as the chair of the negotiation process for the
Good Friday Agreement.191  He also visited London, Belfast, Derry, and
Dublin in November 1995.192  His efforts promoted the British and Irish
governments to reach a new intergovernmental accord.193
Agreements
The Good Friday Agreement is composed of two documents:
1. A multi-party agreement by most of Northern Ireland’s political parties;
and
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. (explaining that the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) was wholly opposed to
Sunningdale and did not participate in the negotiations. Representatives of the
“extremes”— loyalist and republican paramilitaries— were not invited).
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Roger MacGinty, American Influences on the Northern Ireland Peace Process, 17 J.
CONFLICT STUD. 6, 10 (1997).
190. Id. at 1.
191. Id. at 7.
192. Id. at 6.
193. Id.
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2. An international agreement between the British and Irish governments
(the British-Irish Agreement).194
The Agreement (reached in the multi-party negotiations) is composed
of eleven (11) sections containing a group of provisions relating to various
issues regarding North Island.195  Sections 1 and 2 provide the Declaration
of Support and Constitutional Issues.196  The parties acknowledged both
unionist and nationalist views as reflecting the legitimate status of North-
ern Ireland.197  New institutions are referred to in Sections 3– 5.  Section 1
(Strand 1) covers democratic institutions like Assembly and Executive,
while Section 3 tackles the “British-Island” issue.198  Section 5 (Strand 5)
discusses the British-Irish council and their inter-governmental confer-
ence.199  Section 6 stipulates human rights, legislation, new institutions,
the joint committee, reconciliation, economic, social and cultural rights.200
Outcome
The Good Friday Agreement was approved by voters across Ireland in
two referendums held on May 22, 1998.201  It shifted Northern Ireland’s
political environment to a power-sharing regime accepted by the commu-
nity as a whole.202  All signatories to the agreement endorsed the “consent
principle,” which meant that any change in Northern Ireland’s constitu-
tional status— including the Irish unification— would happen if it was
favored in separate referendums held at the same time on both sides of the
border.203
D. Bosnia and Herzegovina: Dayton Agreement (1995)
Synopsis
The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzego-
vina (Dayton Agreement) was formally signed in Paris on December 14,
1995.204  These accords put an end to the Bosnian War that lasted a little
over three years.205
American Involvement
In Dayton, the U.S. Secretary of State, Warren Christopher negotiated
peace talks between the President of Serbia Slobodan Milos˘evic´, the Presi-
194. THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE AGREEMENT (Apr. 10, 1998), http://peacemaker.
un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/IE%20GB_980410_Northern%20Ireland%20
Agreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/BMH2-6FS8].
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Good Friday Agreement, BBC HISTORY, http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/events/
good_friday_agreement [https://perma.cc/B25G-RYUL].
202. Id.
203. The Troubles, supra note 173. R
204. The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bosn.
& Herz.-Croat.-Yugoslavia, Dec. 14, 1995.
205. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\51-1\CIN103.txt unknown Seq: 27 27-AUG-18 14:49
2018 A Historical and Analytic Review 127
dent of Croatia Franjo Tu–dman, and President of Bosnia Alija Izetbegoviæ.
They finally concluded the Dayton Agreement which put an end to the
Bosnian war.  It was the Clinton administration’s contribution to the Bal-
kan peace.206
Agreements
The Dayton Agreement was to promote peace and stability in Bosnia
and Herzegovina.  It also hit the regional balance in and around the former
Yugoslavia.207  They agreed on the present political divisions of Bosnia and
Herzegovina and its governance under Annex 4 of the Agreement.208  A key
component was the delineation of the Inter-Entity Boundary Line, which
many tasks listed in the Annexes referred to.209
Outcome
The Dayton Agreement created the State of Bosnia-Herzegovina com-
prising the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska.210
No entities could be separated from Bosnia and Herzegovina without due
process of law.211  Although highly decentralized in its Entities, a central
government is still working under a constitutional system.212
III. A Way to the U.S.-DPRK Peace Treaty: Problem and Prospect
A. Origin and Evolution for the Armistice Regime in the Korean
Peninsula
1. The Korean Armistice Agreement
The armed hostilities of the Korean War ended with the Armistice
Agreement between the UN Command (led by the U.S. forces) and the
Communist side on July 27, 1953.213  The armistice, however, established
206. Adriana Camisar, Boris Diechtiareff, Bartol Letica, and Christine Switzer, An
Analysis of the Dayton Negotiations and Peace Accords, Final Research Paper of The
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy (2005).
207. P. Cannon, The Third Balkan War and Political Disunity: Creating A Cantonal Con-
stitutional System for Bosnia-Herzegovina, 5:2 J. TRANSNAT’L. L. & POL’Y 373, 395 (1996).
See also Summary of the Dayton Peace Agreement on Bosnia-Herzegovina, http://
hrlibrary.umn.edu/icty/dayton/daytonsum.html [https://perma.cc/Y3SM-VDU8].
208. See Annex 4, The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herze-
govina, https://www.osce.org/bih/126173?download=true [https://perma.cc/RC5Q-
2HXH].
209. See generally General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzego-
vina, U.N. Doc. A/50/79C (Nov. 30, 1995), http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peace
maker.un.org/files/BA_951121_DaytonAgreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/J7WE-6XGD].
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Bosnia and Herzegovina-Country Profile, ONE WORLD NATIONS ONLINE, http://
www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/bosnia_herzegovina.htm [https://perma.cc/6FC5-
QD3T].
213. The document was signed on July 27, 1953, by two delegates: U.S. Army Lieu-
tenant General William Harrison, representing the United Nations Command, and
North Korean General Nam Il, representing both the Supreme Commander of the Korean
People’s Army and the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers. Copies of the
agreement were signed separately by UN General Mark W. Clark, Supreme Commander
of the Korean People’s Army Kim Il Sung, and Commander of the Chinese People’s Vol-
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only a “complete cessation of all hostilities in Korea by all armed
force[s]”214 in the Korean peninsula along the Demilitarized Zone (“DMZ”)
that was to be enforced by the commanders of both sides.  It did not mean
the de jure end of war between the governments, but was only a cease-fire
between military forces.215  In the armistice, both sides did not conclude
any fundamental solutions for completing the war, but reserved it to “a
political conference of a higher level of both side.”  Clause 60 of the Korean
Armistice Agreement provides:
In order to insure the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, the
military Commanders of both sides hereby recommend to the governments
of the countries concerned on both sides that, within three (3) months after
the Armistice Agreement is signed and becomes effective, a political confer-
ence of a higher level of both sides be held by representatives appointed
respectively to settle through negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of
all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question,
etc.216
2. Geneva Peace Conference of 1954
The Geneva Conference took place from April 26 to July 20, 1954.
The main agenda of the conference were to establish peace in both the
Korean peninsula and Indochina.217  According to Clause 60 of the Armi-
stice Agreement, both sides to the Korean War had rendez-vous there, but
there was limited consensus on the Korean question.218  They should have
focused on a “peace treaty,” but cross-fired each other with the terms of
implementing the armistice.219  No fruitful results were obtained in the
end.
In Geneva, the South Korean representative proposed that his govern-
ment be the only legitimate government in the Korean peninsula,
demanded that UN-supervised elections be held in the North, argued for
the Chinese withdrawal of forces, and implored for the UN forces remain as
a police force.220  Conversely, the North Korean representative suggested
that elections be held throughout all of Korea; all foreign forces leave
unteers Peng Dehuai Council on Foreign Relations, Korean War Armistice Agreement,
https://ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=85 [https://perma.cc/5J75-
CVWP].
214. Korean Armistice Agreement art. II(A).
215. Id.
216. Id. ¶¶ 60.
217. See generally M.D. Donelan & M.J. Grieve, INT’L DISPUTES 61 (London, 1973); S.S.
Goodrich, THE NATURE AND FUNCTION OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 261 (Oxford
Univ. Press, 2d ed. 1959); U.S. DEP’T ST. BULL., Mar. 1, 1954, 317– 18.
218. See Sound and the Fury— The 1954 Geneva Conference on Vietnam and
Korea, ASSOCIATION OF DIPLOMATIC STUDIES AND TRAINING, http://adst.org/2015/06/
sound-and-the-fury-the-1954-geneva-conference-on-vietnam-and-korea/ [https://
perma.cc/UC4S-25RP].
219. Id.
220. M.P. SRIVASTAVA, THE KOREAN CONFLICT: SEARCH FOR UNIFICATION 69– 70 (New
Delhi: Prentice Hall of India, 1982); U.S. DEP’T ST., Foreign Relations of the United States,
1952– 1954, Vol. XVI, The Geneva Conference 131– 34 (Washington D. C.: U. S. Govern-
ment Printing Office. 1981).
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beforehand; the elections be run by an all-Korean Commission that is made
up of equal parts from North and South Korea, and economic and cultural
relations be increase between the North and the South.221
The Chinese delegation proposed that a group of “neutral nations”
supervise the elections.222  The U.S. maintained that the Soviet Union
wanted to turn North Korea into a puppet state.223
On June 15, the Soviet Union and P.R. China declared to support a
unified, democratic, and independent Korea.  They stated that negotiations
should resume at an appropriate time. Nothing was agreed between them
till very the end.
3. Geneva Agreed Framework (1994)
Up until the late 1980s, the U.S. maintained a long standoff with
North Korea.  Such hostile relations did not give either side any chance to
refer to peace treaty.224  The turning point ironically came with North
Korea’s nuclear crisis in 1992.  When the IAEA conducted inspections of
nuclear facilities in North Korea, it obtained information that North Korea
was storing nuclear waste from plutonium production.225  The Agency
requested North Korea to reopen the two suspected sites for the special
inspection by March 25, 1993.226  After months of debate, North Korea
declared its withdrawal from both the NPT and the Safeguard Agreement
on March 12, 1993,227 and from the IAEA in June 1994.228
North Korea’s action was a serious challenge to IAEA’s Safeguard, and
fundamentally, the postwar non-proliferation system itself.  The confronta-
tion between the U.S. and North Korea escalated even before a military
clash.229  This nuclear conflict, however, was provisionally resolved by
painstaking diplomatic negotiations that led to the Agreed Framework
signed in Geneva on October 21, 1994.230  Under the Agreed Framework,
the U.S. promised to provide North Korea with the light-water reactor
221. SRIVASTAVA, supra note 220, at 70; U.S. DEP’T ST., Foreign Relations of the United R
States, 1952– 1954, Vol. XVI, The Geneva Conference, at 134.
222. SYDNEY BAILEY, THE KOREAN ARMISTICE 167– 68 (1992).
223. Id. at 163.
224. United States-North Korea Relations, WILSON CTR, http://digitalarchive.wilson
center.org/collection/118/united-states-north-korea-relations [https://perma.cc/59BH-
WH5K].
225. Eric Yong Joong Lee, The Six-Party Talks and the North Korean Nuclear Dispute
Resolution under the IAEA Safeguards Regime, 5 ASIAN-PACIFIC L. & POL’Y J. 101, 104
(2004).
226. Eric Yong Joong Lee, The Complete Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, 9
CHINESE J. INT’L L. 799, 803 (2010).
227. Int’l Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], The DPRK’s Violation of its NPT Safeguards
Agreement with the IAEA, at 1– 2, excerpted from DAVID FISCHER, HISTORY OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (1997), https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/
dprk.pdf [https://perma.cc/4WTZ-84AP].
228. Id. at 2.
229. ERIC YONG JOONG LEE, LEGAL ISSUES OF INTER-KOREAN ECONOMIC COOPERATION
UNDER THE ARMISTICE SYSTEM 50– 51 (2002).
230. IAEA, Agreed Framework between the United States of America and the Demo-
cratic People’s Republic of Korea, IAEA/INFCIRC/457, at 1 (Nov. 2, 1994) [hereinafter
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(“LWR”) at the expense of North Korea’s abandonment of the nuclear weap-
ons development program under the NPT system.231
The Agreed Framework even contains significant provisions to estab-
lish a comprehensive peace regime.  In Article II, the U.S. agreed to “move
toward full normalization of political and economic relations” with North
Korea.232  The U.S. also released concrete enforcement measures so as to
reduce barriers to trade and investment,233 and both planned to open a
liaison office in Pyongyang (the other’s capital).234  In Article III (3), they
further agreed to upgrade bilateral relations to an Ambassadorial level,
which would be connected to concluding a peace treaty.235  Unfortunately,
the Agreed Framework was not fully implemented.236  However, these
accords were a signal of the U.S. policy shift toward North Korea in a more
peaceful way.
4. The September 19 Joint Statement
Such a peaceful way, however, dramatically changed when the Bush
administration recognized North Korea as a “grave threat towards peace
and security of Northeast Asia.”237  Their standoff was getting serious
when President Bush designated North Korea as part of an “axis of evil”
with Iran and Iraq.238  As North Korea indirectly acknowledged its nuclear
weapons development program,239 the situation was taking a turn for the
worst.  Responding to North Korea’s hostile action, the U.S. initiated a “tai-
lored containment policy,” resulting in political and economic sanctions at
the end of 2002.240  North Korea considered it as a grave threat to its
“supreme national interest.”241  On January 10, 2003, North Korea finally
declared its withdrawal from the NPT.242
This “game of chicken” was finally eased through the Six-Party talks.
In the painstaking course of debates, the Fourth Round of the Six-Party
talks released a Joint Statement which reaffirmed “the verifiable
Agreed Framework], https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/
infcircs/1994/infcirc457.pdf [https://perma.cc/NQX6-ZUFY].
231. Id. arts. I & IV.
232. Id. art. II.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Eunice Lee, Operation ‘Denucleunification’: A Proposal for the Reunification and
Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, 33 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 245, 257
(2010).
237. Lee, supra note 226, at 804. R
238. George W. Bush, President, United States of America, State of the Union Address
(Jan. 29, 2002), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/
20020129-11.html [https://perma.cc/CYC7-VNUK].
239. Lee, supra note 225, at 114. R
240. Id. at 115; Erik Raines, North Korea: Analyzing the “New” Nuclear Threat, 12 CAR-
DOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 349, 372 n.113 (2004).
241. Lee, supra note 225, at 115. R
242. Lee, supra note 226, at 805. R
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denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner”243 on Sep-
tember 19, 2005.244  Under Article 4, the Joint Statement advised negotia-
tion of the “permanent peace regime on the Korean peninsula” and to
“explore ways and means for promoting security cooperation in Northeast
Asia.”245
5. The February 13 Agreement
The September 19 Joint Statement was a “systematic roadmap” for
denuclearization.246  However, it resulted in a deadlock from the begin-
ning, mainly because the U.S. froze North Korea’s account with the Macau-
based Banco Delta Asia (“BDA”) in September 2005 a reported political
slush fund of the Kim Jong Il regime.247  North Korea drastically counter-
acted to the U.S. financial sanction with a missile launch and a nuclear test
in July and October 2006, respectively.248
The breakthrough of this crisis was luckily adopted at the fifth round
of the Six-Party Talks held in Beijing between February 8 and 13, 2007.249
The parties finally adopted the Joint Agreement for implementing the Joint
Statement.250  Here, the U.S. promised to resolve the frozen North Korean
asset at BDA within thirty days,251 while North Korea reaffirmed its com-
mitment to a complete cessation of all nuclear programs and facilities.252
In addition to denuclearization, Article III of the February 13 Joint
Agreement referred to the peace regime on the Korean peninsula.  The U.S.
agreed to establish working groups for normalization of the DPRK-U.S.
relations; normalization of the DPRK-Japan relations; and Northeast Asia
Peace and Security Mechanism.253
243. Six-Party Talks, Beijing, China: Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party
Talks Beijing, art. 1, U.S. DEP’T ST. (Sept. 19, 2005), https://www.state.gov/p/eap/
regional/c15455.htm [https://perma.cc/DC2W-9QCJ].
244. Id.
245. Id. art. 4.
246. SANSOO LEE, THE FEBRUARY 13 AGREEMENT: A NEW DAWN FOR NORTH KOREA’S
DENUCLEARIZATION? 13 (2007).
247. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Treasury Finalizes Rule against Banco
Delta Asia: BDA Cut off from U.S. Financial System (Mar. 14, 2007), http://
www.treasury.gov/press/releases/hp315.htm [https://perma.cc/E6H5-YUR5]; Lee,
supra note 236, at 268. R
248. LIU LIN, THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR TEST AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 13– 14 (2006),
http://isdp.eu/content/uploads/publications/2006_lin_the-north-korean-nuclear-test-
and-its-implications.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZH4V-92TG].
249. Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement, MINISTRY FOREIGN AFF.
JAPAN (Feb. 13, 2007), http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/n_korea/6party/action
0702.html [hereinafter Initial Actions] [https://perma.cc/MZ2Z-CGJX].
250. Eun-sook Chung, Long-Stalled Six-Party Talks on North Korea’s Nuclear Pro-
gram: Positions of Countries Involved, 25 KOR. J. DEF. ANALYSIS 1, 3 (2013).
251. Bruce Klingner, Countering Pyongyang’s Next Steps in the Six Party Process, WEB
MEMO 1 (April 30, 2007) (Heritage Found., D.C.), http://s3.amazonaws.com/thf_media/
2007/pdf/wm1438.pdf [https://perma.cc/7LBA-8R5Q].
252. SANGSOO LEE, THE FEBRUARY 13 AGREEMENT: A NEW DAWN FOR NORTH KOREA’S
DENUCLEARIZATION? 18– 20 (2007), http://isdp.eu/content/uploads/publications/
2007_lee_the-february-13-agreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/7KX7-DSXP].
253. Initial Actions, supra note 249, at art. III, ¶¶ 2, 3, 5. R
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B. Political Environment: U.S. Strategic Shift on DPRK toward Peace
Treaty
Since the late 1990s, the U.S. has gradually shifted its strategic stance
towards North Korea.  The Clinton administration finally began conceiving
a “peace regime” as a possible option for denuclearization.254  This strate-
gic shift was triggered by the former Defense Secretary, William Perry’s
proposal for “A Comprehensive and Integrated Approach: A Two-Path Strat-
egy.”255  In his report titled, “Review of United States Policy toward North
Korea: Findings and Recommendations,” Perry maintains:
The first path involves a new, comprehensive and integrated approach to our
negotiations with the DPRK.  We would seek complete and verifiable assur-
ances that the DPRK does not have a nuclear weapons program . . . . this
path would lead to a stable security situation on the Korean Peninsula, creat-
ing the conditions for a more durable and lasting peace in the long run and
ending the Cold War in East Asia . . . . If the DPRK moved to eliminate its
nuclear and long-range missile threats, the United States would normalize
relations with the DPRK, relax sanctions that have long constrained trade
with the DPRK and take other positive steps that would provide opportuni-
ties for the DPRK.256
A few more reports may be considered in this regard.  First, the Philip
Zelikow Report (2006) suggested a bilateral dialogue with North Korea.257
In a CSIS report titled “The U.S.-Japan alliance: Getting Asia Right through
2020,” Richard Armitage and Joseph S. Nye refer to “a high probability” of
a Korean reunification and “the strategic balance in Northeast Asia.”258
The Obama Administration’s North Korea policy was called “strategic
patience,” which was to gradually urge North Korea in a patient attempt to
return to the Six-Party Talks.259  This policy, however, has not been work-
ing out since the Kim Jong Un regime tested nuclear weapons and
launched ballistic missiles.260  President Trump is returning back to
hardline policy towards North Korea’s nuclear weapons test and missile
launches because the UN sanctions are not effectively implemented.261
254. WILLIAM J. PERRY, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, REVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES POLICY
TOWARD NORTH KOREA: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 3, 12– 13 (1999), http://
belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/1997%20NKPR.pdf [https://perma.cc/U4B7-X23X].
255. Id. at 8.
256. Id. at 8– 9.
257. P. Zelikow, Opinion: The Plan that Moved Pyongyang, WASH. POST (Feb. 20, 2007),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/19/
AR2007021900918.html [https://perma.cc/B83L-4CGV].
258. RICHARD L. ARMITAGE & JOSEPH S. NYE, THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE GETTING ASIA
RIGHT THROUGH 2020 7 (2007), https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/leg-
acy_files/files/media/csis/pubs/070216_asia2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/8VTH-Z86L].
259. EMMA CHANLETT-AVERY ET.AL. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41259, NORTH KOREA: U.S.
RELATIONS, NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY, AND INTERNAL SITUATION 6 (2016).
260. Id.
261. Ashley Parker & David Nakamura, In Hard-Line Speech, Trump Warns North
Korea: ‘Do Not Underestimate Us’, WASH. POST (Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.washington
post.com/politics/trump-strikes-more-conciliatory-tone-toward-north-korea-urges-deal-
to-resolve-standoff-with-united-states/2017/11/07/d7f59a6e-c3a4-11e7-a441-3a768
c8586f1_story.html [https://perma.cc/9ALV-FY6F].
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President Trump tried to dismantle North Korea’s nuclear program and the
Kim Jong Un regime itself.262  After the sixth nuclear test on September 3,
2017, President Trump referred to military option against North Korea.263
However, the Trump administration should recognize that North Korea is
not similar to the 1990s’ former Eastern European States who collapsed
like dominos following the dissolution of the Soviet Union.  China is back-
ing up North Korea because both share the same security interest in the
region.  Therefore, a fundamental regime change is not a possible option at
this point.  As a result, a more “comprehensive breakthrough measure” is
needed than the Six-Party talks.  It is to build a peace regime.  President
Trump should open the peace deal with North Korea as President Clinton
tried to do.264  Now is the time to think of a proper peace treaty.
C. US-DPRK Peace Talks and Bilateral Peace Treaty
Peace treaties are officially concluded between former belligerent
States under international law.265  As the U.S., North Korea, and China
were the official signatories of the Armistice Agreement of 1953, all three
countries are entitled to be direct parties to conclude a peace treaty.  South
Korea will be also a party to the peace treaty as a de facto belligerent State
of the Korean War although its military representative did not sign the doc-
ument directly.  Ideally, a comprehensive peace treaty between these four
parties will be the best option.266
In this regard, however, North Korea has been denying the status of
South Korea as a legitimate party concerning the peace talks and a follow-
ing peace treaty.267  North Korea is willing to bilaterally consult with the
U.S. on the question of the Korean peninsula.268  Considering state prac-
tices on peace treaty, the U.S. is expected to tackle each sub-issue individu-
ally step by step.269  Such a grand project cannot be picked up in a
package deal without expending much time.  Considering the circum-
stances, an individual approach would be the most probable alternative at
the initial stage.
262. Id.
263. David E. Sanger & Choe Sang Hun, North Korean Nuclear Test Draws U.S. Warn-
ing of ‘Massive Military Response,’ N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 2, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2x2708A
[https://perma.cc/PSZ7-3U6T].
264. Glenn Kessler, History Lesson: Why Did Bill Clinton’s North Korea Deal Fail?,
WASH. POST (Aug. 9, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/
2017/08/09/history-lesson-why-did-bill-clintons-north-korea-deal-fail [https://
perma.cc/GG5G-VL58].
265. Jann K. Kleffner, Peace Treaties in, THE MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 104, 104– 05 (Rudiger. Wolfrum ed., 2012).
266. JAMES GOODBY, JACK N. MERRITT & DONALD GROSS, A FRAMEWORK FOR PEACE AND
SECURITY IN KOREA AND NORTHEAST ASIA 16 (2007),  http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/
images/files/publication_pdfs/1/070413-North_Korea_Working_Group_Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VA3D-BQ52].
267. North Korea Paper Accuses Seoul of “Denying” June 15 Joint Declaration, BBC MON-
ITORING ASIA PAC. June 10, 2011.
268. See Lin, supra note 248, at 14. R
269. See GOODBY, MERRITT & GROSS, supra note 266, at 13– 14. R
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Therefore, the U.S.-North Korea bilateral peace talks would be a start-
ing point of peace-making on the Korean peninsula in order to resolve their
long-pending conflicts.  Priority should be placed on the nuclear issue.
North Korea has been pushing for the U.S. to normalize their relations up
to an ambassadorial diplomatic level as well as to support its economy
including the energy sector.270  The corresponding deal from the American
side is the “complete, verifiable, and irrevocable denuclearization” of North
Korea.271  North Korea must return to the NPT, dismantle its nuclear devel-
opment program, fully open its nuclear sites, and cooperate with the inter-
national community in the denuclearization process.  The Nuclear-
Weapons-Free Korean Peninsula plan would be the final direction.272
These are the basic conditions for any further negotiations.
A peace treaty is based on peaceful relations and vice versa.  The for-
mer is an expression of the latter in a normative way.  Both are as good as
the relationship between water and fish.  Without one, the other is mean-
ingless.  The U.S.-DPRK peace treaty-making would thus imply that a stra-
tegic balance between the U.S. and China has already been coordinated.
The former U.S. practices indicate that a peace treaty mirrors the establish-
ment of a new regional order.  The U.S.-DPRK peace treaty would be fol-
lowed by a comprehensive peace treaty between the four parties of the
Korean War.  In this course, both North and South Korea could declare the
completion of the Korean War and replace the Armistice Agreement with a
comprehensive peace treaty.  An individual peace treaty could be also
adopted between the two Koreas with details on the peacemaking process
in the Korean peninsula.
D. South Korea as a Party Concerned
Another question is the participation of South Korea in the peace
talks.  South Korea was a de facto and de jure principal belligerent State of
the Korean War. Actually, North Korea’s direct approach to the U.S. deny-
ing South Korea is a strategic concern, mainly because North Korea’s main
interest is to make contact with the U.S. first.  If North Korea is recognized
by the U.S. and can normalize bilateral relations, it does not have to ignore
South Korea as a negotiating partner.  The September 19 Agreement is a
good example.  Independent and detailed agreements should be concluded
between individual parties in order to resolve the problems solely between
them.  The U.S. practices show that this kind of constitutional peace treaty
would not consist of only one single document, but a group of accords
including protocols, action plans, and declarations.273  North and South
Korea should address their direct issues together.  South Korea-China talks
are also likely to go to the same direction, given this approach.
270. Id. at 7– 8.
271. KOREA POLICY INST., THE CASE FOR A PEACE TREATY TO END THE KOREAN WAR 4
(2009).
272. Lee, supra note 226, at 812– 14. R
273. See, e.g., Agreed Framework, N. Kor.-U.S., art. III, ¶ 1, art. IV, ¶ 1, Oct. 21, 1994.
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E. Comprehensive Peace Treaty
As each bilateral negotiation is completed, the four parties may draft a
comprehensive peace treaty.  A draft of the comprehensive peace treaty
would contain the legal, political and economic accords including mutual
recognition of sovereignty, political reconciliation, military confidence
building with disarmament, dissolution of the United Nations Command,
economic exchange and cooperation, etc.274  A practical model can be
inferred from the 1952 San Francisco Peace Treaty and the 1990 Final Set-
tlement with Respect to Germany.275  In this situation, the 1990 Final Set-
tlement would be more relevant because the San Francisco Peace Treaty
was entirely initiated by the U.S., while the Final Settlement was a result of
“Two plus Four” negotiations.276  In the Final Settlement, East and West
Germany consulted with France, the then Soviet Union, the UK, and the
U.S. in the establishment of a unified German state.277  It terminated all
the “rights and responsibilities” of the four outside powers “relating to Ber-
lin and to Germany as a whole.”278  The Final Settlement contains a num-
ber of measures that are appropriate to the two Koreas, including
denuclearizing the German territory, establishing stable external borders,
instituting military force ceilings and Components of a Comprehensive Set-
tlement, reductions, and reaffirming provisions of the UN Charter, the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (“CSCE”).279
A comprehensive peace treaty of Korea could be approved by each bel-
ligerent State under the UN flag, picking up where the Korean War left off.
Their approvals, however, would not be a necessary condition.  A more sta-
ble means to guarantee the effectiveness of the treaty is to have it approved
by the UN General Assembly as an official resolution, thereby registering it
at the UN Secretariat.280
If the contents of the treaty are agreed upon, the draft text should be
adopted by the consent of the parties.  Then, they should establish the text
as authentic and definitive by such procedures as may be provided for in
the text or as agreed to otherwise.281  The adoption and the authentication
of the text do not, however, by themselves create any obligations for the
274. See Annex 1.
275. See Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany of September 12,
1990, http://usa.usembassy.de/etexts/2plusfour8994e.htm [https://perma.cc/9V3Z-
8H89].
276. Id.
277. See id. (noting that the non-German parties to the treaty are the U.S., UK, France,
and the Soviet Union).
278. Id.
279. See A FRAMEWORK FOR PEACE AND SECURITY IN KOREA AND NORTHEAST ASIA: REPORT
OF THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL WORKING GROUP ON NORTH KOREA 16– 17 (Apr. 2007), http://
www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/files/publication_pdfs/1/070413-North_Korea_Work
ing_Group_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/772T-YXCD].
280. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 80, ¶ 1, May 23, 1969 [herein-
after VCLT].
281. Id. art. 10(a).
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parties.282  The peace treaty will finally enter into force in such manner
and upon such a date as it may provide, or as soon as the consent to be
bound by the treaty is expressed by the four parties.283  Article 11 of the
VCLT provides signatures and ratification as the most popular means of
expressing consent.284
A particular question regarding the Korean peace treaty is the replace-
ment of the current Armistice Agreement with the peace treaty.285  It is an
exceptional case in the U.S. peace treaty practices because such replace-
ment processes were few.286  Also, the long history of the Korean armistice
is a deciding factor.  Replacing the Armistice Agreement with the peace
treaty will contain two steps of legal procedures that are closely connected:
the first is the termination of the Armistice Agreement and the second is
entering into the peace treaty.287  The “termination” in the first step means
fully ending the binding force of the rights and288 obligations created by
the Armistice Agreement.289  Article 54 of the VCLT provides that a treaty
may be terminated “(a) in conformity with the provisions of the treaty; or
(b) at any time by consent of all the parties after consultation with the
other contracting states.”290  Because there is no provision of termination
in the Korean Armistice Agreement, the possible way to terminate it is for
each party to agree and declare ending it.291  The premise for termination
is to guarantee North Korea’s denuclearization and normalize the U.S.-
DPRK relations.
The VCLT, under Article 56, paragraph 1(a) and (b), provides the
implied right of denunciation of or withdrawal from a treaty.292  Consider-
ing modern State practice of general armistice, the parties could invoke it
because the nature of the Korean armistice has already indicated de facto
termination of the war which will be further consummated by a final peace
treaty.293  Another concern with respect to termination is the 1992 Agree-
ment on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, Exchanges, and Cooperation
between the South and the North (hereinafter Basic Agreement).  As most
of the provisions of the Basic Agreement are similar to those of a peace
treaty, they should be incorporated into the peace treaty.  Section 6, Provi-
sion 2 of the Northern Ireland Peace Agreement, e.g., lays down a similar
regulation: “The British Government will complete incorporation into
Northern Ireland law of the European Convention of Human
Rights . . . .”294
282. See Lee, supra note 236, at 218. R
283. See VCLT, supra note 280, art. 24, ¶¶ 1– 2. R
284. Id. art. 11.
285. Lee, supra note 236, at 219. R
286. See Annex 2.
287. Lee, supra note 236, at 219– 20. R
288. Id. at 219.
289. Id.
290. See VCLT, supra note 280, art. 54. R
291. Lee, supra note 236, at 219. R
292. Id.
293. Id. at 220.
294. See Northern Ireland Peace Agreement § 6, ¶ 2, Apr. 10, 1998.
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Once the Armistice is officially terminated, there are two ways to effec-
tuate the peace treaty.  One is to enter the peace treaty into force in a man-
ner simultaneously replacing the Armistice Agreement; and the other is to
set up an interim step before the final effectuation of the peace treaty.  In
the latter, the parties should define the legal state of the interim period.295
The UN Security Council can ensure the positive implementation of other
interested States through the endorsement of this agreement.
In practice, however, an official declaration of the replacement would
be unnecessary because core accords of the individual peace treaty may
have already nullified those of the Armistice Agreement.  Making a peace
treaty itself is to end armistice— a de jure situation of war.
F. Beyond the Peace Treaty: Peace Regime
Peace treaty is a stepping stone for building a stable peace regime
(peace as a system) of the Korean peninsula, as well as Northeast Asia.  A
peace regime should be mutually guaranteed by four powers: the U.S.,
China, Russia and Japan.  It could be substantiated by the final settlement
of the complex legal and political issues of the Korean War.  The German
case (“Two plus Four” formula operation) is relevant to our consideration.
At the time, East and West Germany coordinated their diverse interests
with the former Allied Powers (including the U.S., Britain, France, the
Soviet Union) individually and comprehensively to establish a peace
regime toward a unified German State.296  A similar approach like the Con-
ference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (“CSCE”) is advisable in
the Korean Peninsula, too.  These efforts are reflected in Article 7(1) of the
Final Settlement with respect to Germany, which terminates all the “rights
and responsibilities” of the four outside powers “relating to Berlin and to
Germany as a whole.”297
Conclusion
This paper has reviewed peace treaties that were signed and mediated
by the U.S., and then has examined the legal and political conditions for
making the U.S.-DPRK peace treaty.  Considering the many wars that the
U.S. has been involved in since its very creation, its track record with peace
treaties is comparatively small.  Peace treaties were doctrinal measures for
the U.S.  The Americans concluded peace treaties only when they wanted
to fundamentally restructure the regional order after a war or to realize
their strategic interest from a broader and longer perspective in some part
of the globe.  In this course, there are three principles for the U.S. to make
peace treaties.  First, the U.S. has never joined the already established
peace system by other powers through a peace treaty.  Second, the U.S. has
concluded peace treaties bilaterally rather than it being a multilateral
295. See Lee, supra note 236, at 220. R
296. See generally Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, supra note
275. R
297. Id. at art. 7, ¶ 1.
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effort.  This is evidenced by the Treaty of Versailles (1919) and the Treaty
of Saint-Gemain-en-Laye (1919).  The U.S. did not ratify the Versailles
treaty initiated by the European powers, but concluded an individual peace
treaty with each Axis power like Austria, Germany, and Hungary.  In San
Francisco (1951), however, the U.S. led almost all Allied Power to adopt a
single document for peace with Japan.  Nevertheless, the negotiations in
San Francisco were carried out individually with each contacting party.  It
has constructed a new regional order of the postwar period in the Asia-
Pacific region called the San Francisco System.  The Paris Peace Treaties
(1947) are a similar example.  Third, the U.S. concluded peace treaties
when concrete and practical interest for the U.S. exists in that region.  This
principle has been found in the U.S. mediated peace treaties.  If the U.S.
does not conclude a peace treaty with a former belligerent State, it implies
that the strategic interest with that country is not fully defined in the U.S.
Considering the U.S. practices, the U.S.-DPRK peace treaty will be the
key to peacemaking in the Korean peninsula as well as in Northeast Asia.
Such a peace treaty will be also a turning point of the U.S.-China relations.
This research has reviewed various legal, political, and technical questions
involved in drafting and signing the treaty.  Now, North Korea has pro-
posed that the U.S. conclude a bilateral peace treaty, but the U.S. has
raised objections due to Kim Jong Un regime’s nuclear weapon tests and
missile launches.298  This signifies that the U.S. does not want to recognize
the changing status quo of regional politics, yet.  Since the end of the Cold
War, the San Francisco System has not been fully operational.299  The rise
of China is a critical factor that restricts American hegemony in East Asia.
North Korea is manipulating this power vacuum with its nuclear weapons
development program.  The U.S.-DPRK peace treaty means not just the nor-
malization of bilateral relations, but more fundamentally, the recognition
of China as an equal partner in the Asia-Pacific region, which has never
been imagined by the U.S.  It is an irrevocable trend, however.  Therefore,
the peace treaty is not only an agreement to officially terminate the Korean
War, but is a “magna carta” for peace regime, which is the ultimate con-
cern of people in this region.  It can be first established between the U.S.
and North Korea bilaterally, and then exist as a comprehensive formula.
South Korea could be a mediator in this process.
Inter-Korean relations mirror U.S.-China relations in that the U.S.-
DPRK peace treaty will be a crystal ball reflecting the balance of power in
Northeast Asia.  The German Unification Treaty (1990) was the outcome of
a power balance system established between the Allied Powers over Ger-
298. See Elise Labott & Nicole Gaouette, North Korea Offerred— then Rebuffed Talks
with the US, CNN (Feb. 2, 2016), https://www.cnn.com/2016/02/22/politics/north-
korea-nuclear-talks-peace-treaty/index.html [https://perma.cc/7A4C-8YEL].
299. See Kimi Hara, Continuing Legacies of the San Francisco System: Past, Present, and
Future Options, YALE COUNCIL E. ASIAN STUD. (Feb. 5, 2016), https://ceas.yale.edu/
events/continuing-legacies-san-francisco-system-past-present-and-future-options [https:/
/perma.cc/YA2R-C8LR].
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man territory in the post-Cold War era.300  This was a symbol of the com-
plete end of the Cold War in Europe.  The Korean peninsula will be next.
On July 7, 2017, South Korean President Moon Jae-In released his security
doctrine in Berlin toward North Korea for engagement including a peace
treaty.301  Time is ripe for the U.S. under the Trump administration to
accept “peaceful” co-existence instead of “hostile” co-existence.
300. See generally Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, supra note
275. R
301. See Euan McKirdy, South Korea’s Moon: I’ll meet Kim ‘at any time, at any place’,
CNN (July 7, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/07/07/asia/moon-jae-in-south-north-
korea/index.html [https://perma.cc/K8ER-9XBS].
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ANNEX 1
DRAFT
Agreement between the United States of America and the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea on the Termination of the 1953 Armistice,
Denuclearization, and Rapprochement
Preamble
The United States of America (“USA”) and the Democratic People’s Repub-
lic of Korea (“DPRK”) (hereinafter “Contracting Parties”),
Recognizing that peace and stability on the Korean peninsula is the founda-
tion for the prosperity and security in Northeast Asia, and the world;
Recalling that the hostilities of the past decades have posed grave threats to
the peaceful co-existence of States on the Korean peninsula;
Respecting the principle of the United Nations Charter regarding the peace-
ful settlement of international disputes, the spirit of the Geneva Agreed
Framework, and the September 19 Joint Statement on the abandonment of
the nuclear weapons development program of the DPRK in a peaceful
manner;
Reaffirming that the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula is an indis-
pensable requirement for the contemporary international community;
Requiring the termination of the 1953 Armistice and the normalization of
the relationship between the Contracting Parties to establish eternal peace
in this region;
HEREBY have agreed to the following provisions:
Chapter I: Mutual Respect and Recognition
Article 1
The Contracting Parties shall respect the sovereignty, political indepen-
dence and territorial integrity of the other Party. Both parties agree not to
insult or provoke each other.
Article 2
The Contracting Parties shall make efforts to promote peaceful exchanges
and cooperation under international law.
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Chapter II: Termination of the 1953 Armistice
Article 3
The Contracting Parties agree that the Armistice Agreement concluded on
July 27, 1953 shall be terminated and immediately replaced by this Agree-
ment effective from the date of its entry into force.
Article 4
The USA shall effectively disassemble the United Nations Command sta-
tioned in the Korean peninsula conclusively upon consultation with the
United Nations.
Article 5
The Contracting Parties shall closely cooperate to maintain peaceful co-
existence between them following this Agreement.
Chapter III: Military Confidence and Disarmament
Article 6
The Contracting Parties shall refrain from the threat or the use of force
against the other Party under any circumstances. All disputes shall be
resolved by peaceful means as recognized under international law.
Article 7
The USA shall not deploy any strategic weapons of mass destruction in the
Korean peninsula and the DPRK shall discontinue the development and
launch of long range missiles.
Article 8
1. The Contracting Parties shall not undertake any large scale military
exercise in the Korean peninsula. In the interest of preventing military hos-
tilities or surprise attacks, any troop deployment, movements of military
personnel or any military training exceeding the scale agreed to by both
Parties shall be reported to the other’s military authority in advance.
2. To boost mutual military confidence, Contracting Parties may directly
communicate with each other through any convenient or reasonable means
of communication, and exchange military personnel and information with-
out prejudice.
3. The military authorities of each Contracting Party may facilitate the
exchange of liaison officers for the mutual confirmation of military
confidence.
4. Contracting Parties shall consult with each other to set up the joint con-
trol of maritime areas in both the Yellow Sea and the East Sea of Korea.
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Article 9
The Contracting Parties shall retreat the heavy weapons and military per-
sonnel which can be used for surprise attacks from the Demilitarized
Zone. Both Parties shall consult with the Republic of Korea on this matter.
Article 10
1. The Contacting Parties shall operate a Council of Disarmament to be
organized by both Parties jointly, together with the Republic of Korea, the
People’s Republic of China, Russia and Japan.
2. The Contracting Parties shall consult with each other for the details of
military confidence building.
Chapter IV: Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula
Article 11
1. The DPRK shall dismantle and abandon its nuclear weapons develop-
ment program in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner. Any
experiment, test, development, storage, deployment, or use of nuclear
weapons shall be prohibited in the territory of the DPRK or anywhere on
the earth.
2. The DPRK shall return to the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
Treaty (“NPT”) system, assuming full responsibilities and obligations
therein within three months from the entry into force of this Agreement.
3. Upon the entry into force of this Agreement, the DPRK shall cooperate
with the International Atomic Energy Agency (“IAEA”) to facilitate and
comply with safeguard inspections of the nuclear facilities in the DPRK.
4. The DPRK shall open its nuclear sites and provide access to the IAEA for
inspections under Article 12(B) to the IAEA Statute and to the USA in an
effort to verify the abandonment of DPRK’s nuclear weapons development
program.
5. The Contracting Parties shall respect the accords under the Geneva
Agreed Framework and the September 11 Joint Statement for dismantling
the Nuclear Weapons Development Program of the DPRK.
Article 12
1. The USA shall not attack, try to attack, or threaten attacking at any level,
the DPRK with nuclear weapons under any circumstances.
2. The USA shall not take any action for the proliferation of nuclear weap-
ons in the Korean peninsula including import, storage, test, deployment,
operation, or transfer of nuclear weapons or any other related nuclear
material with a view to use it for the military purpose.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\51-1\CIN103.txt unknown Seq: 43 27-AUG-18 14:49
2018 A Historical and Analytic Review 143
Article 13
The Contracting Parties shall make a bona fide effort to establish a nuclear
weapon free zone on the Korean peninsula.
Chapter V: Normalization of Relationship
Article 14
The Contracting Parties shall agree to suspend diplomatic, and political
hostility toward the other Party and set up a friendly relationship based on
mutual respect for state sovereignty under international law.
Article 15
The Contracting Parties shall establish diplomatic ties at the ambassadorial
level in an expedited manner. Each Party will establish a liaison office in
the other’s capital city for handling practical issues, including consular
affairs.
Article 16
The USA shall assist and support the DPRK’s efforts to join regional and
international organizations to fully participate in international affairs.
Article 17
The DPRK shall release all American citizens detained in its territory with
immediate effect upon the entry into force of this Agreement, and assist the
USA to excavate the remains of US military personnel.
Article 18
The Contracting Parties shall promote exchanges and cooperation in cul-
ture and sports.
Chapter VI: Economic Cooperation
Article 19
The USA shall lift with immediate effect upon the entry into force of this
Agreement, economic sanctions placed against the DPRK through the
United Nations Security Council Resolutions.
Article 20
The USA shall remove with immediate effect upon the entry into force of
this Agreement its ban and any other alienating restrictions on the exports
of strategic goods to the DPRK.
Article 21
The Contracting Parties shall promote trade and investment in the other’s
territory.
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Article 22
The USA shall aid the DPRK in tackling the energy shortage of the DPRK.
Details of such assistance will be negotiated between the Parties based on
the Geneva Agreed Framework.
Chapter VII: International Commission for Monitoring, Control and
Supervision
Article 23
1. The Contracting Parties shall organize an international commission for
the monitoring, controlling, and supervision of the implementation of obli-
gations undertaken by both Parties under this Agreement.
2. The international commission under Article 23(1) shall be composed of
representatives of the USA, the DPRK, the Republic of Korea, the People’s
Republic of China, Russian Federation, and Japan under the supervision of
the United Nations.
Chapter VIII: Final Clauses
Article 24
1. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of ratification by both
Parties.
2. The English and Korean texts of this Agreement are both original and are
equally authentic, are to be deposited with both governments as well as the
United Nations.
Article 25
Each Contracting Party shall enact all necessary domestic legislation to
strictly implement the obligations undertaken in this Agreement.
Article 26
This Agreement may be modified by mutual accord.
DONE at Place, on DD/MM/YYYY
For the Government of the United States of America
(Signed):
For the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
(Signed):
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ANNEX 2
Chronology of US Peace Treaties
US-signed Peace Treaties
No Title Date Opposite Parties
Great Britain, France,
1 Treaty of Paris September 3, 1783
Spain
2 The Convention of 1800 September 30, 1800 France
Sweden, Tripoli, Algiers,
3 The Treaty of Tripoli June 4, 1805
Tunis, Morocco
4 Treaty of Ghent December 24, 1814 UK
Treaty of Campode
5 January 13, 1847 Mexico
Cahuenga
Treaty of Guadalupe
6 February 2, 1848 Mexico
Hidalgo
7 Treaty of Tianjin June 13, 1858 UK, Russia, France
8 The Boxer Protocol September 7, 1901 China
Treaty of St. Gemain-en- Republic of German-Aus-
9 September 10, 1919
Laye tria
Germany & Allied Pow-
10 Treaty of Versailles June 28, 1919
ers
11 US-Austrian Peace Treaty August 24, 1921 Austria
12 US-German Peace Treaty August 25, 1921 Germany
US-Hungarian Peace
13 August 29, 1921 Hungary
Treaty
Italy, Romania, Hungary,
14 Paris Peace Treaties February 10, 1947
Bulgaria, Finland
15 Treaty of San Francisco September 8, 1951 Japan & Allied Powers
North Vietnam, South
16 Paris Peace Accords January 27, 1973 Vietnam, Provisional Rev-
olutionary Government
Treaty on the Final Set-
17 tlement‡ with Respect to September 12, 1990 Germany
Germany·
United States-mediated Peace Treaties
No Title Date Parties
1 Camp David Accords September 17, 1978 Egypt & Israeli
2 Oslo Accord I September 13, 1993 Israel & PLO
3 Oslo Accord II September 28, 1995 Israel & PLO
Northern Ireland Peace‡
4 Agreement (The Belfast April 10, 1998 UK & Northern Ireland
Agreement)·
5 Dayton Agreement December 14, 1995 Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia
